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This thesis examines the consequences of British economic policies in Palestine 
from 1920-1936. The government of Palestine needed to accommodate the economic 
demands of the Zionists, the Arabs, the international community, and the British Empire, 
but with so many commitments, the British often ignored the needs of the Arabs in order 
to placate the other groups. Many economic policies had unintended consequences which 
greatly angered the Arabs, hurt their sector of the economy, or both. This thesis attempts 
to break away from the simple approach of viewing Palestine through the prism of the 
dual commitments to the Zionists and the Arabs by broadening the scope and looking at 
British obligations to the international community and the British Treasury. In addition, 
the present work examines British attitudes towards the Zionists and the Arabs in regard 
to developing the country. It also uses Arab complaints to paint a more complete picture 
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The British had many economic responsibilities in Palestine. They were 
responsible for permitting and organizing the settlement of Jewish immigrants while 
somehow simultaneously protecting the rights of the Arabs. The government needed to 
conduct a trade policy that would be beneficial to Palestine and also take into 
consideration the mandate which prohibited discrimination against other League of 
Nation members. Furthermore, the British needed to improve the country in the interests 
of the inhabitants through development projects such as Haifa harbor and the Dead Sea, 
while at the same time balancing the need to promote British industries and contractors 
and allowing other countries to bid on concessions. In addition to the commitments to the 
international community, the Zionists, and the Arabs, the British authorities had to 
promote the wider imperial economy and make sure Palestine was financially self-
sustaining. 
Overall, the government of Palestine kept its commitments to the Zionists, the 
British Treasury, and to an extent the international community, but utterly failed the 
Arabs. The government‟s inability to satisfy their political, social, and economic needs 
during the 1920s and early 1930s led to a major turning point in Palestinian history, the 





goals of the Jewish National Home and the needs of the Arabs were completely 
incongruent. Afterwards, the British policy towards ending the conflict shifted between 
partition in 1937, an Arab dominated state in 1939, and ultimately back to partition in 
1947.  
This thesis looks at British economic policies from 1920-1936 and the 
consequences they had on the Arabs of Palestine. These policies often had unintended 
consequences that either greatly angered the Arabs, hurt their sector of the economy, or 
both. This thesis will put economic policies into a much wider scope by emphasizing the 
commitments to the British Treasury as well as to the international community in 
addition to the dual commitments to the Zionists and the Arabs and will explain how 
British attempts to meet the first three obligations often precluded aiding the Arabs. It 
will also use the economic grievances of the Arabs to construct a comprehensive picture 
of the economy of Palestine. By focusing on the unintended consequences, this work will 
help produce a better understanding of British economic policies.  
While other authors have examined British economic policies in Palestine, they 
suffered from three limitations. First, they usually were limited in scope and either 
focused on agriculture or industry. This prevented them from developing a complete 
picture of the economy of Palestine. Second, previous works usually stressed the dual 
commitments to the Zionists and the Arabs and greatly underemphasized the constraints 
placed on the government of Palestine by the British treasury and the mandate. Finally, 
most focused on economic policies of the government in order to examine the growth of 







The great bulk of the historiography on mandatory Palestine until 1936 focuses on 
political and social events. While economic policies have not been covered as much by 
historians, the idea that they contributed to Arab frustration is not new. May Seikaly, 
Mahmoud Yazbak, and Sonia el-Nimr have all previously written on the subject. 
Seikaly‟s book, Haifa: Transformation of an Arab Society: 1918-1939, deals with the 
socio-economic and political changes that occurred in Haifa during the early mandate. 
Economically, she examines the segregation of the Jewish and Arab economies by 
analyzing protective tariffs provided for Zionist industries, the much slower growth of the 
Arab sector, the decline of the Arab mercantile class, and discriminatory labor policies. In 
his article, “From Poverty to Revolt: Economic Factors in the Outbreak of the 1936 
Rebellion in Palestine,” Mahmoud Yazbak explicitly traces the capitalist penetration of 
Palestine to the 1936 Revolt. He also explains how British policies, such as the 
commuted tithe, failed to help the fellaheen and how discriminatory wage practices 
angered the unemployed Arabs who flooded the coastal cities because of failing 
agricultural conditions. In her dissertation, Sonia el-Nimr briefly discusses the symbolic 
and economic importance of the British giving key concessions to the Zionists and how it 
greatly upset the Arabs. 
While these works are important for examining British economic policies, they 
are often limited in scope or breadth. Even though Yazbak alludes to wider economic 
conditions and constraints that prevented the British from properly regulating trade, he 





agricultural policies. El-Nimr only briefly discusses the economic issues before delving 
into the bulk of her dissertation, the 1936 Revolt and the role played by the fellaheen.  
Barbara Smith‟s book, The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: British Economic 
Policy, 1920-1929, is the most important text for understanding British policies towards 
the Palestinian economy during the early mandate. She demonstrates how the British 
nurtured Zionist desires for economic power and how this process helped to separate the 
Jewish and Arab economies during the first decade of the mandate. The policy of the 
government at the beginning of the 1920s was laissez-faire, but this quickly changed 
because of Zionist pressure and the desire of the British Treasury to develop a financially 
self-sustaining state. The government later began actively supporting the Jewish sector 
through protective tariffs for industries and generous concessions for Jewish 
entrepreneurs. 
  Martin Bunton‟s book, Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, 1917-1936, is critical 
for understanding how the government perceived land tenure. Bunton claims that the 
government did not possess a monolithic approach to the subject and instead fluctuated 
between favoring the free market, the desire to develop the country, and the need to 
protect the fellaheen. His section on agricultural credit illustrates how the lack of land 
title was only one factor which prohibited the creation of agricultural cooperatives and an 
agricultural bank in addition to fiscal constraints and the lack of the government‟s 
commitment. 
 Kenneth Stein‟s works examine several other aspects of land tenure in Palestine. 
In his book, The Land Question in Palestine: 1917-1939, he not only looks at how 





British policies. His article, “Legal Protection and the Circumvention of Rights of 
Cultivators in Mandatory Palestine,” succinctly shows how legislation passed by the 
government failed in its goal of protecting the fellaheen. 
Little Common Ground, written by Charles Kamen, is an important text as it is 
one of the first to fully address the agricultural system of mandate Palestine. He claims 
that Jewish settlement had little effect, either negatively or positively on the overall 
tenure of the Arabs. Instead, it was British unwillingness to significantly address 
agricultural problems that exacerbated the poverty of the fellaheen. The most important 
aspect of Kamen‟s book is his thorough analysis on the overall economic structure of 
Palestine and his criticism of Jacob Metzer‟s theory of the dual economy.  
This theory states that the economy of mandatory Palestine consisted of two 
separate economies, a modern Zionist and traditional Arab. Kamen criticizes this theory 
and instead argues that the economy of Palestine must be seen as a single entity.
1
 He 
emphasizes how there was a great deal of interaction between the two groups through 
land sales, and labor. Furthermore, as we will see, British economic policies regarding 
one group often affected the other.  
 Julian Finegold‟s dissertation, “British Economic Policy in Palestine: 1920-1948,” 
shows that for the most part, the British and the Zionists had a symbiotic economic 
relationship. The government created conditions that allowed for the growth of the 
Jewish National Home while the Zionists were able to contribute to the country‟s 
Treasury. He further describes the relationship between the governments in Jerusalem 
and London. Economic policies were created in the Colonial Office, which, given the 
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tradition of such a department, sought to run Palestine like a colony. This sometimes ran 
counter to the objectives of the administration in Palestine which needed to run the state 
as efficiently as possible for the sake of the British budget, but also sought to advocate 
for the local economy. Finegold is also the only historian to thoroughly describe the 
entire history behind the Palestine Loan of 1926.   
The Palestine Royal Commission: Minutes of Evidence is crucial for 
understanding the economic grievances of the Arabs. In response to the outbreak of 
violence in 1936, the British sent a commission headed by Lord Peel to investigate 
conditions in the country. All of the public sessions were published. Granted, while most 
of the sessions were dedicated to conversations with leaders from the government of 
Palestine and the Zionist Executive, the evidence taken from the few Arabs involved is 
extremely helpful in revealing the grievances of the indigenous population.  
These complaints included high rural taxation, tariffs instituted to protect Jewish 
industries, the lack of an income tax, the government‟s handling of the major 
concessions, and the failure to protect the peasants. The Arabs blamed the British for 
establishing a bloated bureaucracy, thus draining the coffers of Palestine instead of 
spending the money on aiding the destitute Palestinian agriculturalists. The main 
complaint was that the British government supported the creation of the Jewish National 
Home at the expense of the Arabs. They accused the British of creating superfluous 
agencies and an extensive military apparatus all meant to sustain Jewish growth. Some of 
those who gave statements were „Awni Bey „Abd al-Hadi, founder of the Istiqlal party 
and a member of the Arab Higher Committee; Jamal Bey al-Husayni, member of the 





and secretary of the Arab Higher Committee; and Dr. Khalil Totah, headmaster of the 
Friends‟ School in Ramallah. The greatest weakness, as pointed out by the Palestine 
Post, was that all the Arabs who presented arguments in front of the commission were 
effendis, the Arab elites. While this is a valid complaint, these effendis did convey the 
economic grievances of the wider population. 
As for archival material, this thesis relies heavily on “The Records of the United 
States Consulate in Jerusalem, Palestine Confidential Correspondence, 1920-1935,” and 
the “Colonial Office Palestine Original Correspondence, 1921-1949.” The reports from 
the American Consulate are particularly useful because they contain valuable insight 
from a completely different perspective. The other archival source, the Colonial Office 
Correspondence, is replete with analyses, discussions, and debates over British policy in 
Palestine. While the archive consists of the years 1921-1949, only the years 1927-1934 
have been reproduced on microfilm (and hence are available in the United States.) This 
material covers the most critical economic decisions for the 1920s and the early 1930s. 
The Colonial Office correspondence is not only helpful in illustrating how policies were 
formulated within the Colonial Office, but underscores the interplay between the 
governments in London and Jerusalem in addition to illustrating the efforts of the Zionist 
Organization to exert pressure on the British. The correspondence also contains valuable 
memoranda that were never published.  
 
Outline 
 This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first looks at how imperial policies 
and international commitments interfered with economic decisions for Palestine. The 





but the mandate‟s clause against discrimination prevented this. In order to circumvent 
this obligation, the British used the issue of Jewish labor to have the construction done 
through the Department of Public Works, and therefore keep the project under British 
control. While the harbor provided for imperial goals and Zionist economic development, 
the decision to have the construction undertaken departmentally, and by partly using 
expensive Jewish labor, increased the costs.  
The mandate left Palestine vulnerable and prevented it from discriminating 
against countries that dumped excess products into its markets without taking any of its 
exports. Therefore, Palestine relied heavily on its trade with Great Britain. The Colonial 
Office and the government in Jerusalem fought vigorously to get Imperial Preference 
extended to Palestine, but due to complications arising from Britain‟s most favored 
nation clauses with other countries, this never happened.  
 The second chapter looks at British policies towards industry and development. 
The government granted Zionist industries generous duty exemptions and protection, 
hoping that industrial development would aid the Arabs. This was not the case and 
instead, the fellaheen paid higher prices for goods. The government also granted the 
Zionists crucial concessions for hydroelectricity, the Dead Sea minerals, and the Huleh 
swamp with the assumption that development would also benefit the entire country. This 
greatly angered the Arabs as the exploitation of these resources significantly helped 
Zionist development. They also questioned the power of the British to distribute the 
resources to a small section of the country. The government‟s labor policies were very 
complex. On one hand, it needed to make sure to construct projects as cost effectively as 





Zionist Organization. Throughout the mandate, the government discriminated against the 
Arabs by paying the Zionists higher wages. The construction of Haifa harbor is an 
example of how even when the government sought to establish a common wage, it 
continued to discriminate. The government also sought to protect the rural Arab society 
and used paternalistic policies to prevent Arab labor organizations.  
The final chapter examines policies towards agriculture. International trade 
obligations and Zionist pressure prevented the British from fully protecting agricultural 
products in the early 1930s. Combined with a worldwide drop in agricultural prices and 
crop failures, this pushed more fellaheen into poverty. The government attempted to 
tackle the problem of unjust taxation on the fellaheen with the commuted tithe of 1927, 
but due to its rigid nature, droughts, crop failures, and international problems, combined 
with a rise in the immovable property tax, the plan backfired. The Arabs had always 
demanded the implementation of an income tax and were greatly upset in 1934 when the 
income tax commission found that it was premature to establish it in Palestine. While a 
logical conclusion as it would have been impossible to enforce, this took place in a 
charged political environment where the decision was viewed as the government once 
again siding with the Zionists. The government‟s parsimony meant that agricultural credit 
was not provided for the fellaheen until the 1930s. Instead, the government sought to 
alleviate the situation of the peasants with legislation, but collusion between the Zionists 
and wealthy Arab landlords meant that land sales and the dispossession of the fellaheen 
continued unabated. Overall, the British commitments to the international community, 
the Zionists, and the empire all helped lead to the unintended consequences of British 









THE IMPERIAL ECONOMY AND PALESTINE 
 Palestine had participated in the global economy for centuries, but during the 
1920s and 1930s, its economic position depended on British policies and the stipulations 
of the mandate. During the early 1920s, when the League of Nations created the mandate 
system, the prevailing economic belief was that free trade would encourage peace. 
Several clauses of the Palestine mandate prohibited discrimination against the access of 
foreign goods and companies to Palestinian markets and development projects. However, 
by 1930, many states had implemented artificial tariffs to protect their own goods, with 
the result that the Palestinian economy was encumbered with an outmoded economic 
philosophy. 
 At the same time, according to the mandate, the British had an obligation to 
support the development of the Jewish National Home while protecting the rights of the 
Arabs. While these requirements were certainly unbalanced and favored the Zionists, the 
main point is that the British did have obligations to both groups. While both sides 
continuously advocated for their respective societies, the Zionists were far more 
successful in holding the government‟s feet to the fire. The Arabs refused to recognize 
the mandate, and in consequence, their leaders often snubbed offers to discuss important 





acknowledgement of the mandate. The Zionists on the other hand possessed numerous 
economic organizations that not only demanded action from the British but were able to 
provide the government with detailed memoranda and recommendations regarding 
policies. The British had reasons for cooperating with Zionists economically. London 
hoped that world Jewry would harness its supposed economic power and invest heavily 
in Palestine which would in turn allow for less British investment. 
 This would assuage the British taxpayer and politicians who clamored for the 
administration to reduce its budget. With Great Britain hit hard by the economic 
downturn in the early 1930s, the government of Palestine needed to make economic 
decisions which would not only serve the British taxpayer, but support British companies. 
The governments in London and Jerusalem also needed to have a larger, empire-wide 
perspective when deciding policies in Palestine given that trade relations between Britain 
and Palestine could affect interactions between the home country and the dominions or 
foreign states.  
 This chapter will explain how, through the examples of Haifa harbor and Imperial 
Preference, British economic policies towards Palestine were often complicated by 
international commitments and when the economic demands of Palestine clashed with 
those of Britain, the latter always won out. In addition, we will see the confluence 
between imperial needs and developmental goals of the Zionists.  
 
Haifa Harbor 
If only local Palestinian interests were at stake, I would say, as I 
have said before, that I would prefer to drop the whole project and 





bound up with Imperial interests in connection with the trans-desert 




Palestine always had a port that had met its international shipping needs. 
Immediately after the Islamic conquest, it was Gaza, while from the crusades to the mid-
19
th
 century, Acre played a prominent role. By the mandate, both these ports had fallen 
into a dilapidated state
3
 and Palestine lacked a proper harbor to deal with 20
th
 century 
shipping. While the opening of a port at Tel Aviv helped, particularly during the citrus 
season, it lacked the size and facilities needed to handle the desires and shipping 
requirements of the British. 
Though ostensibly for the development of Palestine, in actuality, the construction 
of Haifa harbor was in fact part of the British government‟s Middle Eastern imperial 
policy. Jacob Norris makes the point that the British holdings in the Middle East during 
the interwar period must be viewed as a coherent entity.
4
 Their mandates stretched from 
the Persian Gulf at Basra through Transjordan to the Mediterranean coast of Palestine. 
The mandatory had two goals; one, the exploitation of natural resources, mainly 
Mesopotamian oil, and to lesser extent potash from the Dead Sea. The second was to 
secure the air route through the Middle East to India.  
Haifa harbor was to act as a refueling station for the British fleet. Previously, the 
British navy had refueled at Alexandria, but with the granting of the Palestine mandate 
and the declaration of Egypt‟s independence in 1922, a harbor in Palestine seemed a 
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 Barbara Smith, “British Economic Policy in Palestine towards the Development of the Jewish National 
Home.” Ph.D. diss., University of Oxford, 1983, 312-13. Citing Sir John Shuckburgh‟s minute 3 December 
1928. 
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much more controllable location. In addition, the British wanted an oil hub on the coast 
to compete against French-controlled Beirut. More importantly, by 1935, the harbor was 
the end point of an oil pipeline beginning at Kirkuk. 
Haifa possessed several geographical features that made it ideal for an imperial 
harbor. The Carmel mountain ridge juts into the Mediterranean, creating a natural bay 
protected by Acre to the north.
5
 Haifa also is a perfect location in that it is better 
connected to the rest of the Middle East than other Palestinian cities. Jaffa, Haifa‟s main 
competition, is well located to serve the needs of the Palestinian people, but the central 
highlands cut the city off from Transjordan. Therefore, Jaffa could not accommodate the 
British who needed access to a much larger hinterland. Haifa on the other hand was 
located at a break between the central hills and the Galilee through the Jezreel valley that 
linked to the Jordan valley. These two geographic features created a perfect outlet to the 
wider Middle East as it was easy to construct roads and lines of communication there. 
Access through the Jordan valley connected to Transjordan and eventually to Iraq. It was 
only through Haifa that the British could connect Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean. 
The harbor was to be paid for through the 1926 Palestine Loan that had originated 
during Sir Herbert Samuel‟s administration (1920-25). He had spent money for public 
works through advances from the Crown Agents without the approval of the Colonial 
Office, and the loan was therefore meant to pay off this deficit spending. The Colonial 
Office tacked on an extra £1,115,000 for harbors at Haifa and Jaffa.
6
 During discussions 
in the House of Commons, the Colonial Office claimed that any expenditure from the 
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loan not spent in Palestine would be spent in Britain. This stipulation helped convince 
those members of parliament still on the fence, but nothing was officially attached to the 
loan. After much debate in parliament, the British agreed that as long as Palestine paid all 
the interest, the British would guarantee the loan. Although the Colonial Office conceived 
of the plan in 1924, it did not pass parliament until 1926 when it was attached to the East 
African Loan. 
The Arabs protested the imperial nature of the harbor. The British would receive 
the benefits while the Arabs would have to pay for it. Dr. Khalil Totah claimed that the 
country took a high interest loan so that the British could use their companies to build 
what would be essentially a British naval base.
7
 The other complaint was that the 
government used British materials and companies exclusively for construction even when 
foreign ones were cheaper. This was a common practice of the British.
8
 In order to get 
around the clause of the mandate prohibiting the government of Palestine from 
discriminating against foreign goods, the British had Crown Agents buy supplies for the 
country instead. The British used this method to purchase goods for the country ranging 
from construction materials for the harbor to pharmaceutical drugs. Haifa harbor was just 
one instance, though by far the largest, in which the British exploited Palestine for the 
benefit of its own companies. 
Instead of opening up the construction to bidding, the Colonial Office did its 
utmost to make sure that British industries and interests monopolized the project. British 
intentions clearly went against the terms of the mandate which specified that the 
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 Memorandum based on conversation with Dr. Khalil Totah. Enclosed in Consul General Ely E. Palmer, 
Jerusalem, to Secretary of State, 22 September 1934. Records of the United States Consulate in Jerusalem, 
Palestine, Confidential Correspondence, 1920-1935 (Record Group 84). Reel 2, 341-359. 
8





government could not discriminate against other countries in regard to access to 
concessions for public works not undertaken directly by the government itself. London at 
first tried to disregard the principles of the mandate, but eventually, when the Colonial 
Office ultimately conceded to international pressure in 1929, it still transgressed the spirit 
of the law by building the harbor governmentally and guiding contracts towards British 
firms. This section will look at the legal wrangling between the Colonial Office, the 
Foreign Office, and other countries, and how in order to skirt around international 
obligations, the Colonial Office eventually decided to construct the harbor through the 
Public Works Department. In the end, it was the Palestinians who picked up the extra 
costs. 
When the Colonial Office first accepted the plans to build the harbor, the original 
intention was to have the project done through the government of Palestine. Over time, 
while the British continued to flirt with the idea, many officials questioned its economic 
viability. The head engineer of Rendel, Palmer & Tritton, the firm employed by the 
government to develop plans for the harbor, wrote a comprehensive memo on the 
financial dangers of having the project done by the government. Not only would there be 
a great deal of wasted resources, as the government of Palestine possessed no previous 
experience with a large-scale harbor, but the costs of machinery and supplies would be 
much higher.
9
 A contractor uses the same machinery over and over, transferring them 
from one project to another. This allows him to charge less. If the government of 
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Several months after the memorandum, the High Commissioner Herbert Plumer 
(1925-28) soured on the idea of governmental construction. What seems to have changed 
his mind was that the head of the Public Works Department of Palestine, Fawcett Pudsey, 
admitted that the costs, if done departmentally, had the potential to balloon. He made two 
convincing arguments. Construction companies have books of the most qualified workers 
whereas if done departmentally, no locals would have the adequate experience, and the 
learning curve would be very steep. In addition to this, the bidding process would keep 
expenses down. “A contractor who aims at high profits is underbid by another who is 
satisfied with reasonable profit, and frequently by one who is content with quite a small 
margin of profit in order that he may find employment for a permanent staff…”11 While 
the cost and speed of the construction played a role in the decision-making process, there 
were two other main factors that had initially led to the idea of departmental construction. 
One of these was the need to increase Jewish employment and to promote the 
establishment of the Jewish National Home. The Zionist Organization had applied a great 
deal of pressure on the government to hire a greater proportion of Jews for public works. 
The depression of 1927 hit the Jewish community especially hard in Haifa and Tel Aviv 
to the extent that the Zionist Agency could no longer support their unemployed. Several 
times late in the year, the government had to lend £1,000 to the municipality of Tel Aviv 




The Construction of Civil Engineering Works. Head of the Department of Public Works, Fawcett Pudsey. 
Enclosed in High Commissioner Lord Plumer, Jerusalem, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 January 





in order to keep the unemployed Jews from starting bread riots.
12
 The British saw the 
harbor as a giant public works project with which they could manage Jewish 
unemployment. This would not only assuage the demands of the Zionist leadership, but 
would ultimately alleviate British financial obligations in Palestine. Lower 
unemployment and a better economic atmosphere usually led to more subscriptions to 
Zionism from world Jewry. Larger amounts of Zionist investment could replace that of 
the British. 
 The other main reason was that by carrying out the project through the 
government of Palestine, the Colonial Office and the Crown Agents could control where 
the materials were purchased. The goal was to steer contracts to British companies. The 
Colonial Office viewed the project as a spoil of war. British blood had been spilt 
conquering Palestine. In addition, London had expended a great deal of energy in 
governance and, theoretically, their reputation and credit in that they backed the 1926 
Palestine Loan and therefore saw it as their right to exploit any construction. 
In mid-1927, the Colonial Office in conjunction with Lord Plumer decided that it 
would be faster and more efficient to have the British construction company McAlpine 
and Sons carry out the project as they were on the brink of finishing a harbor in Ghana at 
an amazing pace and were prepared to move all the machinery to Palestine right away. 
All in the Colonial Office agreed that if speed were the main factor, they were the ones to 
undertake the project. Sir John Shuckburgh, the Undersecretary at the Colonial Office, 
said, “provided that political difficulties could be overcome… the contract should be 
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offered without competitive tender to Messers. McAlpine.”13 Clearly, the Colonial Office 
understood that what they had intended on doing contradicted the mandate. 
The Crown Agents threw cold water on the plan. They met the offer by McAlpine 
to complete the project 18 months ahead of schedule with severe skepticism and stated 
that the situations in Ghana and Palestine were vastly different. They also added that 
without proper preliminary surveys, it would be impossible to make such an offer.
14
 
Furthermore, the surveying engineers stressed that in order to establish what a decent 
price would be for the construction, it would be necessary to put the project up for 
bidding.
15
 Very quickly, others understood that a rushed concession to McAlpine would 
be completely uneconomical.  
Once it was decided that it would be economically advisable to seek tenders, the 
major question in the early months of 1928 was how to invite British applicants without 
causing an international controversy that could drag the Colonial Office to The Hague. 
The Colonial Office in conjunction with the Foreign Office sought the advice of the Law 
Office, which said that it would not go against article 18 of the mandate to invite 
applications from a select group of firms that all just happen to be British, but it would be 
if they opened up the bidding to all British firms and discriminated against foreign ones.
16
  
Invitations were then sent to 11 select British companies. 
At the same time, matters moved apace internationally that obfuscated the 
situation. The American, Italian, and Dutch embassies all wrote to the British requesting 
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information on the specifics of the concession, assuming that under article 18, all of their 
companies would have equal access. Many discussions between Jerusalem and the 
Colonial Office revolved around how to delay responding long enough so that even if 
foreign firms were allowed to give a tender, they would not have sufficient time to fully 
prepare one. Once it became clear that the British had intended to ask for tenders only 
from select British companies, the international community was in an uproar, particularly 
the Americans and the Italians. The American Consul went to visit Fawcett Pudsey and 
when confronted, the director of the Department of Public Works smilingly said that the 
project was a closed proposition.
17
 The Italian consulate received a similar response. In 
1929 during a conversation with High Commissioner Sir John Chancellor (1929-1931), 
the American Consul brought up various issues involving Haifa harbor construction. 
When the American claimed that the British discriminated against them, Chancellor 
justified it by exclaiming that they lost men conquering Palestine and were spending 
British funds in administrating the country. The American felt that throughout the 
conversation, Chancellor was dismissive of his complaints and ultimately that the British 
were treating Palestine as if it were a Crown Colony and not a mandate.
18
  
With a potential international legal clash on the horizon, the Law Office 
reexamined the case and came to the conclusion that the plan of inviting tenders from a 
few British companies now was not consistent with article 18 of the mandate.
19
 What 
changed their minds was that in three separate cases between 1921 and 1926, the High 
                                                          
17
 Vice Consul in Charge J. Thayer Gilman, Jerusalem, to Secretary of State, 20 October 1928. Records of 
the United States Consulate in Jerusalem, Reel 2, 1189-1191. 
18
Memorandum of Conversation with British High Commissioner 12 June 1929.  Enclosed in Consul 
General Paul Knabenshue, Jerusalem, to The Secretary of State, 25 June 1929.  Records of the United 
States Consulate in Jerusalem, Reel 1, 1151-1159. 
19





Commissioner had promised the Italian government and companies that they would be 
able to apply for public work concessions when the time came. The Law Office said that 
in order to prove that there was no discrimination, it would have to be shown that the 
earlier offers which were acceptable then, would at present no longer be in the best 
interests of Palestine.
20
 In their opinion, and the Foreign Office agreed, this could not be 
done. 
While the Foreign Office then wanted to open up tenders to international firms, 
the Colonial Office, led by Leo Amery, refused to back down. A debate broke out 
between the two departments and the correspondence between Amery and Lord 
Cushendon of the Foreign Office proves the extent to which the Colonial Office was 
willing to go to protect British interests. Amery argued that they could ask for tenders 
exclusively from British companies based on the stipulation of the 1926 Palestine Loan 
that nonlocal expenditures must be spent in the UK. He further added that without the 
British guarantee on the loan, Palestine would not have received such a low rate of 
interest. According to him, Britain saved Palestine nearly £90,000 a year.
21
  
Lord Cushendon reminded the Colonial Office that no clause regarding spending 
was ever officially added to the loan. He then made a cogent point that illustrates how the 
British not only understood their role in the construction of the harbor, but their task in 
Palestine during the entire mandate. He rephrased a statement that Austen Chamberlain 
made earlier that year. “…As mandatory power she [Britain] was to look out for the best 
interests of the people of Palestine. On the other hand, the British needed to promote the 









interests of British manufacturing and industry.”22 If there had been a stipulation, it 
would have proved that Britain was acting in her best interests and not Palestine‟s. Since 
the stipulation was never adopted, the British now had to do what was in the best interests 
of Palestine, and allow for international tenders.
23
  
Defeated, Amery wrote on 4 December 1928 that “the least disadvantageous 
course is to revert to some form of departmental construction…”24 We have already seen 
the myriad ways in which this route would be the least economical for the people of 
Palestine. The Colonial Office simply refused to allow international companies in on the 
development of the country. While this discrimination was clearly for the benefit of 
British industries, the Colonial Office tried to rationalize the decision, at least internally. 
It claimed that if an international company were to receive the concession, and if there 
were a disagreement between the Colonial Office and the concessionaires during the 
construction, the latter might take the British to court and demand exorbitant 
compensation rather than finish the project.
25
 The Colonial Office adduced that on the 
other hand a British company would not dare to take its own government to court and risk 
its reputation.  
Sir John Shuckburgh, Sir Cecil Hurst, and Frederick Palmer, representing the 
Colonial Office, the Foreign Office, and the engineers on the ground, respectively, met in 
the Colonial Office on 11 January 1929 to discuss how to explain to the international 
community why the government now planned on carrying out the project departmentally. 
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They decided that in order to abate any chance of anger leading to a court case, the 
Colonial Office needed to prove that the decision to do the work departmentally was in 
the best interest of the people of Palestine. It was therefore concluded that they would 
claim that the policy of building the Jewish National Home required employment in 
public works, including the harbor, and that the high minimum wage needed for the Jews 
would make it nearly impossible for a company to agree to such terms.
26
 Therefore, in 
order to ensure that Jews were hired in large numbers and that their wages were up to 
European standards, it was necessary to have the harbor built by the government.  
Since the government decided to carry out the project itself, other countries could 
not evoke article 18 of the mandate which prohibited discrimination. Even though Haifa 
harbor construction did not go against the letter of the law, the situation continued to 
infuriate many. In a letter, the Italian ambassador to Great Britain enunciated the situation 
perfectly, 
…while this procedure may conform to the mere letter of the agreements which 
declare open to „the participation of Italian enterprises in public works, services 
and utilities and in the development of the national resources of the country so far 
as the matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration‟…the 
international mandate does not represent a right or a prerogative for the 
mandatory power, but a mission entrusted to it, in the conduct of which it is to 
derive no direct advantage-- it being on equal footing in the economic field with 
other members of the League of Nations--the Royal [Italian] Government believes 
that it is right in regarding the direct assumption by the Palestinian administration 
of the more important public works as a system contrasting with the spirit of the 
international agreements…27 
 
By January 1929, the main decisions regarding the construction of the harbor had 
been made. It would be built through the government, although this would raise the price 
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by at least £285,000.
28
 Smaller and more insignificant contracts would be given to 
foreign tenders in order to placate the international community.
29
 The Colonial Office 
through departmental contracts could then ensure that British and Palestinian resources 
were used exclusively. The Colonial Office was able to justify the decision by arguing 
that Jewish employment, and therefore Palestine‟s interests, were being guarded, while 
skirting around the legal provisions of the mandate. British and Jewish interests were 
protected. The only problem was that the extra costs of the harbor would ultimately be 
paid by the taxpayers of Palestine and would come, not from the amount allocated to 
security, but from extra spending on social and developmental projects. 
 
Imperial Preference 
The British government often fell short in developing the economy of Palestine 
during the 1920s and 1930s. Sir Herbert Samuel devoted quite a lot of resources to public 
works, much to the chagrin of the Treasury, so that later High Commissioners found their 
financial flexibility greatly limited. Aiming to make the Palestine railroad system 
profitable, the government withheld permission from road-building projects and of course 
the bulk of the budget was devoted to security and the administration.
30
 Police stations 
were ubiquitous while spending on agricultural and development programs for Arabs 
suffered. The granting of Imperial Preference would have been one case in which British 
governance could have significantly succored the economy, as it would have allowed 
Palestinian goods to enter Britain duty free or at a greatly reduced rate. Although 
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Zionists, wealthy Arabs, and the Colonial Office pushed for the preference throughout the 
1920s and 1930s, the British Government never granted it. 
The concept of Imperial Preference came about during the 1920s and was part of 
a wider ideological battle between what Ian Drummond calls, the “free traders vs. the 
imperial visionaries.” The imperial visionaries, including Leo Amery and Sir Phillip 
Cunliffe-Lister, believed that the interference of government generally could improve 
economic conditions, whereas the free traders, including Winston Churchill, argued that 
market forces left alone would regulate the economy. Governmental intervention on an 
empire-wide scale would include subsidized emigration, capital exports to colonies, and 
Imperial Preference.
31
 The basic ideology, of which Amery became the standard bearer, 
was that Britain had a duty to help the colonies develop and in these three ways, the 
colonies could best cultivate their resources, which in turn could be exploited by the 
home government.  
Even though Amery, most of the Colonial Office, and the Zionist Organization 
saw the economic benefits of granting the status of Imperial Preference to Palestine, some 
within the British government were not convinced. A memorandum written on the 
subject was inconclusive. It stated that there would be no economic benefit immediately, 
and the only value would be a greater degree of confidence of the Palestinian people in 
the government and better ties between the Zionists and Jerusalem.
32
 On the other hand, 
the author could not say whether or not in the future Palestine would accrue financial 
benefits. T. K. Lloyd concurred, and went on to claim that there was no need to grant 
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What these detractors failed to take into consideration was that the sectors 
affected, mainly mixed Jewish and Arab citrus, Arab and Bedouin grain, and Jewish 
wine, faced almost insurmountable difficulties in gaining access to large foreign markets. 
Because all League of Nation members were granted an „open door‟ to trade in Palestine 
through the mandate, they had no reason to import Palestinian goods and instead dumped 
their excess products in Palestine. Without being able to attract other countries to import 
its goods, Palestine significantly depended on its trade with Britain.  
 The Colonial Office and the Foreign Office argued several times over whether it 
was possible to grant Imperial Preference to Palestine. Amery, backed by the government 
in Jerusalem, argued vigorously in favor of it, and while the Foreign Office was 
sympathetic to the demand, stated that in their opinion, Britain‟s international obligations 
precluded it. The overriding fear was that if England offered the preference to Palestine, 
it would go against commercial treaties Britain had with other countries. It would open a 
Pandora‟s Box leading to lawsuits against Britain and possible discrimination against 
English goods. 
 The Colonial Office first brought up the topic in 1921. Subsequently, the Law 
Office quickly shot down the idea. The largest stumbling block to granting preferential 
treatment was that the Law Office defined Palestine as a separate, independent state 
based on paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which 
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categorized Palestine as a class A mandate.
34
 Given the unique feature of the Palestine 
mandate, which included the establishment of the Jewish National Home, the Colonial 
Office was uncertain whether Palestine would fall within classes A, B, or C.
35
 The 
classification was critical in that B and C mandates, given their lower status of 
development and greater dependence on the mandatory, would be regarded as part of the 
Empire and therefore eligible for Imperial Preference.
36
 In essence, class A mandates 
were independent of the mandatory power and the granting of the preference to them 
would therefore go against most favored nation clauses of British trade agreements which 
elucidated that if London granted a “third state” or a “foreign state” better terms, the 
country with which the agreement was made could demand the same footing.  
The following year, Winston Churchill brought up the topic again with the 
Economic Board which supported the ruling of the Law Office and added that such an 
agreement would not benefit Britain at all.
37
 This case is extremely interesting for two 
reasons. First, Winston Churchill notoriously opposed any form of Imperial Preference 
for the empire and must have only supported this case because of his affinity for Zionism. 
Second, the Economic Board clearly misunderstood the issue by partially basing their 
reason on the economic benefit to Britain. The Colonial Office had never argued that it 
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would help London. The issue was always seen as a potential gift from the mandatory for 
the development of Palestine.   
By 1924, Zionists had started vocally demanding the preference. In a legal brief 
written for the Jewish Agency, Sir John Simon and Lord Erleigh argued that the issue 
should not be whether Palestine was independent or not, because this issue remained far 
too ambiguous, but whether Palestine was an “other” country. Clearly, this was not the 
case given that Palestine was dealt with through the Colonial Office whereas other 
countries were handled through the Foreign Office.
38
 The Zionist Executive joined the 
fray as well. Its economic advisor, Dr. Kasteliansky, argued that a “special relationship” 
existed between the mandatory and Palestine and that the former had a “moral 
obligation” to grant the preference.39 He also claimed that even if Palestine were not part 
of the empire, it would not be an obstacle as America had granted Hawaii preferential 
status before its annexation.
40
  
While Zionist organizations were becoming more vocal on the issue, the Colonial 
Office wrote a memorandum in 1928 backed by new arguments. It also made reference to 
paragraph 4 of article 22 of the Covenant, but claimed that this paragraph explained that a 
class A mandate may be considered an independent state, not that it must be.
41
 The 
Colonial Office again referred to the ambiguous position established with the creation of 
the Jewish National Home. Amery argued that clearly, Palestine could not be conceived 
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as independent as Syria and Iraq, the two other class A mandates, both of which 
envisioned a much more limited role for the mandatory. The memorandum also used the 
logic provided by the Jewish Agency four years before in that the British government 
runs Palestine; if Palestine is a foreign state then “His Majesty is in the position of being 
a foreign state vis-a-vis himself.”42 
There was an intense back and forth on the status of the application for Imperial 
Preference and Palestine, but the Foreign Office armed with backing from the Law Office 
refused to budge. The issue finally came to a head on 28 October 1928 during a meeting 
between the two departments. The Foreign Office mentioned that its main objection was 
that granting the Preference to Palestine could endanger the entire system. The Law 
Office had assured them that the issue would involve many of Britain‟s commercial 
treaties, and that it would only take one objection for the entire subject to be taken to 
court. It was far too risky; on top of that, the Foreign Office was confident that several 
states would protest.
43
 Though the Colonial Office continued to present the idea to the 
Foreign Office and the Law Office throughout the 1930s, the decision not to grant 
Palestine Imperial Preference had been settled, at least in London, by 1929. 
During the 1930s, the Zionists continued to petition for the granting of the 
Preference. The Palestine Post published dozens of articles on the subject. It claimed that 
with Imperial Preference, Palestinian citrus could finally defeat Spain, its main 
competitor, and dominate the British market.
44
 The people of Palestine, the Post claimed, 
instead of being helped by the mandatory, were “rudely shut out” from the British 
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 The anxiety felt by citrus growers was understandable given that over-
production of oranges in Palestine nearly led to the industry‟s collapse in the mid-1930s.   
The citrus industry was not the only one clamoring for Imperial Preference. The 
wine industry centered in Rishon LeZion petitioned the government several times and 
Amery even used one in an argument with the Law Office in 1925. By 1927, the industry 
had been greatly hampered due to new British tariffs that changed the categorization of 
wine. The old system differentiated between two levels of wine based on their alcoholic 
content; products with less than 30 proof and those 30-42 proof. The new system 
continued to have two levels but the least alcoholic one consisted of those beverages with 
less than 25 proof. Palestinian wine, which was 26-29 proof, would thus be in the higher 
alcoholic category and therefore pay three times more in duty than before.
46
 The demands 
of Dominion wine makers had precipitated the new tariffs as they were losing the British 
market to cheap Spanish imitation port wines that slid in under the lower category.
47
 The 
new tariffs were a method of preserving the effectiveness of the Imperial Preference. 
With Palestine relying so much on its largest importer, Britain, Palestinian goods 
struggled to compete without Imperial Preference. 
While the cases discussed so far have dealt with instances in which Jews mainly 
would have gained from Imperial Preference, Arab producers who exported to Britain 
would also have benefited. There are two reasons only the Jewish voices were heard in 
London. First, the Zionists were far better organized and any complaints could reach 
London either through Dr. Chaim Weizmann or the Zionist Executive. On top of that, 
they also had official societies to represent the various industries. By contrast, the Arab 
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economy lacked an overarching cohesiveness. There was no permanent mechanism to 
relay messages to London. 
Cooperation between the two groups on the matter of Imperial Preference never 
materialized. Arab and Jewish citrus growers tried several times to organize a joint 
delegation to petition London, but they never succeeded. The most famous aborted 
attempt was in 1933 when „Abd al-Rahman Bey Taji, a member of the Supreme Muslim 
Council, and his brother offered to pay half of the costs of sending the delegation. It 
never happened because of pressure from other Arab growers who feared that even this 
sort of economic cooperation with Zionists could hurt the Palestinian nationalist cause.
48
  
The Bedouin near Gaza likewise would have benefited. Before World War I, 
British Scotch distillers used Gaza barley because of its special blending qualities.
49
 After 
the war, without Imperial Preference, foreign competition began to corner the market. 
While the Arabs did not petition the British, Sir Herbert Samuel argued on their behalf. In 
1923, he wrote to the Colonial Office that Gaza barley,  
…was vitally important to Southern Palestine. The town of Gaza was destroyed 
by British bombardment and still remains in ruins… should this concession be 
refused, the district would be deprived of what was the principal market for its 
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The Haifa Harbor incident proved to the Arabs that the intentions of the British in 
exploiting its construction for their own benefit meant that Palestine was treated just like 
any other colony. London was more than willing to sacrifice Palestinian finances to 
support home industries and was prepared to incur the wrath of the international 
community through breaking the spirit of its international commitments. However, 
imperial objectives generally coincided with those of the Zionists. Not only did the 
harbor alleviate Jewish unemployment, but as we will see later, it played a crucial role in 
the development of Zionist industry. The matter of Imperial Preference shows that the 
British were not disposed to granting the mandate the most beneficial aspect of being a 
“colony” and that they were not prepared to challenge their international obligations on 
behalf of the economy of Palestine. In this case, while the Colonial Office attempted to 











INDUSTRY: ZIONIST DEVELOPMENT, ARAB FRUSTRATION 
 Throughout the 1920s, the British implemented certain strategies in order to 
support the development of the Jewish National Home. Thus, the government gave the 
Zionists vital concessions over raw materials and enacted trade measures to protect their 
growing industries. It also paid Jewish workers more than Arabs in order to enable them 
to have a European standard of living. The Arabs saw Zionists increasingly come to 
dominate the economy of the country. To them, the British seemed extremely biased in 
their economic decisions. While the government hoped that these measures would help 
develop the economy for both groups, the Zionists received the vast bulk of the benefits, 
to the growing resentment of the Arabs. 
 This section will look at the issues of industry, concessions, and labor. The 
protection afforded to Zionist industries allowed them to grow and absorb thousands of 
new Jewish immigrants, but this came at the expense of the Arab consumer and the 
country‟s Treasury. While Zionist industries began to dominate the economy, it is 
important to note that Arab industry also grew during the 1920s and 1930s despite British 
neglect. Arabs were not necessarily against industrial development, but were profoundly 





This section will also examine how British tariff policies towards the Palestine Salt 
Company, Shemen Oil, and Nesher Cement all negatively affected the Arabs.  
The history of the concessions proved that Arabs had been interested in the 
development of Palestine long before the arrival of the Zionists. Several Syrians had 
applied for the concession of the Huleh swamp and at least one Palestinian sought to 
mine for minerals in the Dead Sea. Many foreigners also wanted to exploit the few 
resources of the country. In the end, the British decided to give all the major concessions 
to Zionists as their interests and notions of development coincided. The government‟s 
position towards Arab labor additionally illustrates how biased the mandatory power was. 
In order to preserve Palestinian agricultural society and keep labor costs down, the 
government hindered the development of any Arab labor movement that could challenge 
traditional rural leadership and demand higher wages. The example of the wages for 
unskilled workers during the construction of Haifa harbor illustrates how the government 
still found a way to discriminate even when it became official policy to equalize the pay 
of Jews and Arabs. 
 
Jewish and Arab Industry in Perspective 
It is evident that Arab industry cannot in the long run compete with 
the Jewish, where technical skill or the use of import raw material 
are needed. It seems to us inevitable that as the industrial enterprises 





The Ottoman government had tried to promote industry starting in the 1870s, but 
faced several obstacles. First, it suffered from corruption. Although laws had been 
established exempting machinery imports from tariffs and abolishing internal duties, 
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Donald Quataert makes the point that many of these laws were never enforced and tariffs 
were collected anyway.
53
 Second, and most importantly, the capitulations prohibited the 
Ottomans from establishing a tariff policy that would protect domestic industries. Any 
pro-industrial policies during the late 19
th
 century helped only Jewish and foreign 
entrepreneurs, who possessed the necessary capital to invest. 
With very little actual support from the government to invest in industry, a great 
deal of the Arab elites put their money into land, which was normally a safer investment. 
A landowner could easily make money through rent, or if near the coast, through growing 
citrus. Nevertheless, a small but vibrant class of entrepreneurs called Tujjars emerged 
who, unlike the landed elite, made their money from commerce.
54
 By the early 20
th
 
century, they had begun investing in industry and attempted to modernize along Western 
lines. One example is that of „Abd al-Rahman al-Nabulsi who invested heavily in soap, 
which he then exported to Egypt. Gad Gilbar emphasizes that these entrepreneurs played 




 Many of these industries were directly related to Palestine‟s natural resources. 
Given the fact that Palestine‟s main product was grain, flour mills were pervasive 
throughout the countryside. Olive oil presses were widespread throughout the Galilee and 
over a dozen soap factories existed around Nablus. Other industries focused on creating 
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ancillary goods for the main products such as cigarette packages and wooden boxes for 
citrus. Arab industrialists focused on small, labor-intensive industries that would cater to 
the Arab population.
56
 In addition to the industries based on local resources, the presence 
of pilgrims helped to establish factories for souvenirs and mother of pearl carvings in 
Jerusalem and Bethlehem.   
Arab industry during the mandate has been almost completely ignored by 
historians. In some regards, this is understandable. The Zionists kept meticulous records 
as it was necessary for the issuing of immigration permits to know how many more 
workers industries could absorb. The Arab economy lacked the cohesion needed for this 
kind of an undertaking. The British also failed to maintain accurate statistics. In 1927, the 
government carried out its only in-depth survey on industries, but this was greatly flawed 
because it relied on self-reporting. On top of that, the government refused to release the 
breakdown of industries by ethnicity.
57
 With no other comprehensive survey to compare 
it with, it is hard to quantitatively approach the issue in regards to Arab factories.  
Roger Owen admits that far less is known about Arab than Jewish industry. This 
lack of information though has led some to ignore the importance of Arab production. 
For example, Jacob Metzer only quickly glosses over the Arab sector, and even then, it is 
only in order to compare it with that of the Zionists. Sherene Seikaly adroitly points out 
that this sort of thinking allows “the divided economy narrative of modern Jewish 
industry versus rural, traditional Arab agriculture to proceed unchecked.”58 This trope 
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perpetuates the inaccurate generalization that Arabs had no interest in the development of 
the country. A proper analysis of Arab industry is therefore very hard to come by.  
May Seikaly‟s book, Haifa: Transformation of an Arab Society, remains one of 
the few works to delve deeply into the realities of Arab industry. Throughout the 
mandate, Arab industry continued to grow, albeit at a far slower rate than that of the 
Zionists. She claims that Arabs continued to control several sectors of the economy, such 
as foodstuffs. Arabs owned most of the flour mills in the country, the largest of which 
was The National Palestine Flour Mills Co. Ltd which had a capital of £50,000.
59
 Arabs 
also owned most of the chocolate and sweets factories.
60
 Haifa became the center for 
several large Arab-owned tobacco manufacturers, the one major Arab industry that the 
British actively protected throughout the 1920s.
61
 Due to the boom in the population of 
Palestine, Arabs began to produce building materials such as pipes, tubes, and nails. 
Between the end of World War I and 1928, Arabs started 1,373 factories, and from 1931 
to 1937, opened 529 more.
62
 Salim Tamari, citing the Peel Commission Report, argues 
that by 1936, the Arab economy included not just handicrafts, but a variety of factories 
hiring more than 5 employees.
63
 
 This is not to overstate the size or strength of Arab production. The negative 
industrial legacy of the Ottoman period and the attitudes of the conservative landed elites 
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continued to inhibit Arab industrial growth throughout the mandate. This was 
exacerbated by the British who discouraged Arab industrial investment. In the spirit of 
preserving Palestinian society, the government supported the policies of the landed elites 
of investing primarily in land and citrus in hopes that they would cooperate politically. 
The government‟s active support of the patronage system, despite its abuse of the 
fellaheen, was an essential strategy to preserve the status quo and societal stability. Large 
investments in industry on the other hand would encourage the creation of a large mass of 
urban laborers who no longer shared bonds with the landed elites and rural society. This 
would lead to a great deal of instability for the government. On top of that, the British 
envisioned industry as an economic sphere suited solely for the skills of the Zionists and 
dismissed the notion of Arab participation. Frustration among the Arabs grew as they saw 
a confluence between British policies and Zionist growth while their share of the 
economy continued to dwindle rapidly. Arab anger at the lack of British support was 
confirmed in the Hope Simpson report, one of whose recommendations was that the 
government should encourage Arab industry.
64
 
During the Peel Commission hearings, the Arabs argued that the British had done 
little to protect their products from foreign competition, and instead, through licensing 
and registration fees, were forcing many small workshops to close. One industry hurt was 
‘arak, a traditional alcoholic beverage of the Levant. The two largest sources of alcohol 
in Palestine were a large winery at the Jewish colony of Rishon LeZion, and dozens of 
small family owned ‘arak distilleries in Bethlehem. With alcohol production rapidly 
growing in the 1920s, the British sought to control the industry by increasing licensing 
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fees. These fees were based on the alcoholic content and given that ‘arak contains a very 
high proof, the producers of it paid 50 mils whereas wineries paid 6 mils.
65
 The Jewish 
winery could absorb the cost, but the small Arab workshops could not, and many of them 
shut down.  
The government wanted to encourage the export of alcoholic beverages and 
introduced an excise tax on liquor meant for domestic consumption. Although the British 
did not purposely establish this in order to discriminate against Arab production, that is 
exactly what happened. The Jewish wineries had worked hard at marketing their product 
internationally ever since the early 20
th
 century when Rishon LeZion was under the 
control of Baron de Rothschild. ‘Arak on the other hand was produced solely for 
domestic consumption, and therefore, the Arabs were disproportionately hit with the 
excise tax.   
Another Arab industry hurt by British policies was mother of pearl carvings in 
Jerusalem. They had been a favorite of Christian tourists for decades, but during the 
mandate, foreign mother of pearl products labeled as Palestinian began being sold and 
started cornering the market. The government did not give the industry any protection 
until 1934.
66
 Foreign competition, combined with onerous licensing fees, caused many of 
these small workshops to close. In 1936, Fuad Effendi Saba claimed that the “industry is 
nearly dead.”67 
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From the mid-1920s on, Jewish industry grew exponentially. Between 1929 and 
1933, the Zionists started 913 factories, 353 of which were large-scale industrial 
undertakings with each employing over 10 workers. The number employed, production in 
pounds, and the amount of raw materials used, all nearly doubled within those four 
years.
68
 With large capital infusions from wealthy Jewish immigrants in the mid-1930s, 
Jewish industry further expanded from 50% of the country‟s industrial production in 
1927 to 60% in the early 1930s. By the late 1930s, it reached 72%.
69
 In 1942, Jewish 
industries on average employed nearly four times the workers, used 15 times more horse 
power, and had five times greater production in pounds than those of the Arabs.
70
  The 
growth of Zionist industries quickly surpassed that of the Arabs largely thanks to the dual 
policy of exempting imported raw materials from duties while increasing tariffs on 
foreign competition. 
Sir Herbert Samuel and the Colonial Office continuously debated the role of 
government in developing the economy of Palestine. Devastated by World War I and 
seemingly centuries of neglect, the High Commissioner believed that Palestine 
desperately needed the support of the state in order to pursue industrial development. 
Samuel wanted to spend money on infrastructure and to promote industry actively by 
creating a special governmental commission to investigate what measures the 
government should take. The fiscally conservative Colonial Office disagreed. The 
promotion of industry was to be strictly limited to what the Arabs or Zionists could 
achieve on their own.  
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Samuel had taken a personal interest in large Jewish companies and was 
instrumental in drastically reducing tariffs on raw materials and machinery. He asked for 
the exemptions as early as 1921 while arguing that the establishment of Jewish industries 
would create economic prosperity for all living in Palestine and therefore lead to the Arab 
acceptance of Zionism.
71
 The Colonial Office refused because this would negatively 
affect state revenues, which depended greatly on customs duties. 
 In 1924, Samuel again approached the Colonial Office with a list of goods he 
claimed, if exempt from duties, would immediately lead to the creation of new 
factories.
72
 The Colonial Office accepted this list, reasoning that it would help streamline 
inconsistent tariff laws left by the Ottomans, assuming this would be a one time event.
73
 
The government in London thus created a draft Customs Duties Exemption Ordinance of 
1924 that was limited in scope. The Zionist Organization and the High Commissioner 
constantly lobbied the government until it was eventually greatly expanded. Sir John 
Shuckburgh said about the ordinance that, “the cloven hoof of „protection‟ appears in 
paragraphs 5 and 10… the excuse for a departure from fiscal propriety is that it is such a 
little one.”74 What started out as an exception to the rule soon became the rule, as Zionist 
industries began applying for exemptions the following year. By the late 1920s, London 
had granted hundreds of exemptions because of constant pressure from Jerusalem and 
Zionist organizations such as the Economic Board for Palestine. In addition to 
exemptions, the government also began instituting higher tariffs on imported goods in 
order to protect these industries.  
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The changing atmosphere of the late 1920s led to a greater impetus by both the 
government of Palestine and the Zionists to push for greater exemptions and protection 
against foreign goods. Zionists realized that industry could help absorb a greater number 
of immigrants. The government in Jerusalem, sick of the Zionists blaming it for not 
sufficiently supporting the Jewish National Home, saw the encouragement of industry as 
an easy way to placate them. The growth of Zionist land holdings was already greatly 
aggravating the Arabs and industry seemed to the government as a solid nonpolitical 
sphere to encourage Zionist investment. While industry never matched the ideological or 
nationalist significance of the Zionist notion of „conquest of the land‟, it became a very 




 In addition to this, the immigrants of the late 1920s and mid 1930s were 
wealthier and more urban than their predecessors. The Russian immigrants of the late 
19th and early 20th century were poor and came to Palestine with socialistic ideals of 
returning to and conquering the land. The new immigrants were members of the Polish 
and German bourgeoisies fleeing their homes for political or economic reasons. The 
government understood the importance of this new class of immigrants. It believed that 
supporting the growth of Zionist industries would solve multiple problems. In addition to 
meeting the obligations towards the Jewish National Home, a large industrial boom 
would lead to an improved economic situation for the Arabs as well. Overall, the hope 
was that with the creation of greater prosperity, the Arabs would finally come to terms 
with Zionism. Instead, British policies granting Zionist industries exemptions on the 
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importation of resources and heavily taxing foreign competition only helped to strengthen 
the Zionist position while greatly hurting the standard of living of most Arabs. 
The Arabs had two arguments. First, exemptions caused a loss to revenue which 
in turn prohibited the government from spending money on the development of their 
sector. Second, high protective tariffs raised the cost of living for the Arab consumer. The 
Arab community unswervingly complained about the exemptions and high protective 
tariffs for Jewish industries, though none of the commissions and reports ever considered 
this to be on the same level as the major grievances of land sales and immigration. In 
1929, a coalition of Arab Chambers of Commerce sent High Commissioner Sir John 
Chancellor a letter complaining that the government was “protecting the industries of a 
few Jewish capitalists at the expense of a higher cost of living to the majority of the 
inhabitants.”76 That same year, the first Arab Economic Congress was held with 
prominent Arabs from the commercial, industrial, and financial sectors. They demanded 
that high tariffs, like the one on cement, be reduced.
77
 The Arab newspapers of al-Karmil 
and al-Yarmouk regularly lampooned British industrial policies.
78
  
Several meetings of the Peel Commission in 1936 focused on industry and tariffs. 
In his statements on how the government‟s policies were inherently biased towards the 
Jews, „Awni Bey „Abd al-Hadi said that the high tariffs adopted in order to grow Jewish 
industries hurt the Arabs since they, as consumers, would have to pay higher prices while 
they received none of the benefits. He also alluded to the fact that Zionist industries took 
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advantage of the government‟s general acquiescence in these appeals during the late 
1920s. “As soon as any small manufacturer who has a couple of hands working in his 
factory makes an application to Government for protection, then a prohibitive tariff is 
levied in order to protect that industry.”79   
Fuad Effendi Saba, an accountant and member of the Arab Higher Executive, 
argued that a high tariff policy was not sustainable in an agricultural country like 
Palestine. He claimed that tariffs were appropriate for an industry for a few years as long 
as it did not hurt the population.
80
 By the mid-1930s, the government was still protecting 
large industries like Nesher Cement which originally received protection a decade earlier. 
Saba said that the companies were making excessive profits off the back of the consumer 
and therefore protective tariffs should be abolished after a few years of their 
implementation. Industries established on an economic basis would survive, whereas 
those which did nothing but drain money from the consumer and the government would 
die out. Given the fact that Palestine had no natural resources, most Zionist industries 
would fold without the protection of tariffs and exemptions. The Arabs also complained 
that by subsidizing Jewish industries, the government was tacitly supporting further 
Jewish immigration, the largest Arab grievance.     
Government commissions seem to validate the complaints of the Arabs. The Hope 
Simpson Report of 1930 agreed that the protective measures for Jewish industries did 
indeed raise costs for the consumer. A 1936 governmental memorandum on customs 
duties claimed that when raw materials were exempt, the revenue of the state suffered 
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and when protective duties were implemented, the consumer suffered.
81
 Furthermore, 
given that many of the protective duties were on items of common use and not luxury 
goods, the cost of living affected the poorer consumers disproportionately.
82
 It went on to 
question if the protective measures were even worth the loss of revenue. By 1936, what 
was clear was that large Zionist factories such as Shemen and Nesher were turning large 
profits and that the “protection afforded to the Company [Nesher] accrues largely to the 
shareholders of the company…”83  
 Zionists on the other hand contended that Jewish industries hired Arabs. In 1935, 
Jewish industries employed 1,800 Arabs.
84
 In addition to the large public works projects 
and construction jobs, employment in Zionist industries encouraged destitute fellaheen to 
migrate to the cities. Many industrialists could not pass up the opportunity to hire much 
cheaper Arab workers, although the push by Histadrut, the largest Jewish labor union in 
Palestine, for the exclusive use of Avoda Ivrit, or Hebrew labor, led many factories, such 
as Shemen Oil, only to employ Jews throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Arabs were also 
paid far less than Jews. Sometimes, companies would use Arabs for unskilled jobs and 
Jews for skilled and semiskilled ones, thus avoiding blatant discrimination which would 
greatly anger the Arabs. Even skilled Arab laborers faced discrimination in wages, 
though the disparity between them and their Jewish counterparts was far less than for 
unskilled Arab labor. (See Table 1.) Overall, the jobs given to Arabs did not outweigh the 
costs of Zionist industrial growth to the Arab consumers and agriculturalists who 
subsidized it.   
                                                          
81
 Colonial No. 133 Palestine Royal Commission: Memoranda Prepared by the Government of Palestine 
(London: HMSO, 1937), Vol. 2, 5C, 32. 
82
 Ibid, 38. 
83
 Ibid, 32. 
84





Table 1. Wages for Skilled Labor 1929. CO 733/165/67049. 
Average Wages paid to Skilled Labor 1929 per 9 hour day 
 Non-Jews mils Jews mils 
Stone dressers 460 530 
Masons 475 500 
Plasterers 410 425 
Painters 350 400 
Carpenters 445 485 
Blacksmiths 360 460 
Mechanics 425 475 
 
Palestine Salt Company 
The government of Palestine often supported protective measures for industries 
that seemed to be economically unsustainable. In 1922, the Palestine Jewish Colonization 
Association, or PICA, which created the Palestine Salt Company, was given a concession 
to produce salt from evaporation pans as a reward for carrying out the draining of the 
malaria infested Athlit marshes.
85
 This decision went against the goals of the Colonial 
Office, which had abolished the Ottoman Salt Monopoly in 1921 partly in response to 
Arab demands. The government in essence simply transferred control of the salt market 
from the Ottomans to the Zionists. The decision to award the concession “to a Jewish 
company, by a Jewish High Commissioner, and signed on behalf of the administration by 
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Colonel Solomon, a Jew… invited charges of favoritism.”86 Already the new system of 
salt production was off to a bad start. 
The PSC faced stiff competition from legal and illegal sources. Salt prices in 
Palestine remained unaffordable for the fellaheen, and given that it was an essential part 
of their diet, smuggling from Transjordan and Egypt became a lucrative profession 
cutting into the profits of the PSC. The greatest threat to the PSC though was salt legally 
imported from Egypt. By 1925, the company was in horrible financial shape. Even 
though the government was buying up over half of its entire product, the company lost 
over £P2 million that year. 
In 1906, the two largest Egyptian salt producers, the Port Said Salt Association 
and the Egyptian Salt and Soda Company had merged to form the United Egyptian Salt 
Company in order to dominate the Egyptian market. Though officially they did not 
possess a monopoly, the government provided the UESC with favorable production 
policies. Since it also possessed an enormous amount of resources, the UESC became a 
regional juggernaut during the 1920s and 1930s. Its scale of production made it much 
more cost efficient than the PSC. For example, it cost the UESC only .5 piastres per ton 
to grind salt whereas it cost the PSC ten times that amount.
87
 Even with a quasi-
monopoly on domestic production, the PSC was being undersold and losing its home 
market to the Egyptians.  
In 1926, the company petitioned to the government for protection. There had been 
no excise tax or a protective tariff on salt since the Salt Ordinance of 1925, which 
abolished the Ottoman laws regarding salt. Therefore, the market price that the PSC 
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received was at the mercy of Egyptian and smuggled salts. Starting in 1926, the 
government contemplated adding an excise tax on domestic production for the purpose of 
revenue, but coupled with a duty on foreign salt to protect the local industry. Lord Plumer 
planned to implement a £1 per ton protection for PSC through a £3 per ton duty and £2 
per ton excise tax. 
Sir Robert Waley-Cohen, the director of the Economic Board of Palestine, a 
London-based advocate for Zionist industries, wrote saying that the £1 per ton protection 
was not nearly enough and that it would result in “the extinction of the company.”88 He 
wanted to double the protection. According to a memorandum from the company and 
letters from the Economic Board of Palestine, the PSC only had the potential to become 
economically viable if it were vigorously protected by the administration. The company 
said that in time, it would produce salt as efficiently as the Egyptians and blamed current 




Several officials within the Colonial Office disagreed on the optimistic prospects 
of the company and believed that the PSC was bound to fail no matter how much 
protection the government granted it. The PSC‟s domination over domestic production 
would be over in 1927 and there were then to be at least two new domestic salt producers. 
The government granted Shukri Deeb and Company the concession to the rock salt at 
Jebel Usdum, just south of the Dead Sea and home to the famed pillar of salt known as 
Lot‟s Wife. In addition to that, Moshe Novomeysky‟s mining in the Dead Sea was also to 
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lead to a new source of salt. Through the process of extracting the potassium chloride, 
salt would be a byproduct.
90
 Officials stated that it seemed that the PSC and its supporters 
were so obsessed with competition from Egypt that they utterly failed to acknowledge the 
increasing threat from domestic sources. A. J. Harding claimed, “… the company is 
clearly an uneconomic concern and the longer it is bolstered the worse its fall will 
probably be.”91 On top of that, other regional salt companies were chomping at the bit to 
gain access to the Palestine market. One of these, a company from Cyprus was just 
waiting for an opening, and given the proximity, would have had no problem in 
transporting the salt to Palestine. 
Even with these dire predictions from several very sympathetic sources, Lord 
Plumer decided to prop up the company. In June of 1926, he had planned on increasing 
the protection to 500 mils per ton. By Early 1927, it was to be £1 per ton. Later in the 
year, the High Commissioner added protection by lowering the excise tax to £1.500 mils, 
thereby giving the company a protective tariff of £1.500 mils.
92
 
In essence, the government granted the PSC generous protection out of a sense of 
obligation to the fact that PICA was draining the swamps and therefore wanted the 
company to survive. The Arabs had initially protested the concession because of the 
favoritism towards the Zionists, but after 1927, continued to object to it because the 
government had stepped in and financially protected the company at the cost of the 
consumer. During the Peel Commission hearings in 1936, Fuad Effendi Saba stated that 
the high rate of duty on imported salt hurt all Arab consumers, but particularly the poorer 
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 The PSC survived, limping along throughout the 1930s until it stabilized with the 
onset of World War II. The example of the PSC shows that the Arabs were upset at the 
British for squandering resources for the benefit of Zionist industries which seemed to be 
destined for failure as well as raising the cost of living for the consumer.  
 
Shemen Oil 
 The fact that Shemen Oil directly affected Arab soap producers, olive oil 
manufacturers, and Arab farmers of olives and sesame seeds, makes the company and the 
protection the government granted it unique. There usually was no overlap or competition 
between Jewish and Arab products, but Shemen was an exception as it made soap and 
oil-based products which challenged the long standing soap and olive oil production of 
Palestine. Protection provided by the government allowed Shemen to grow exponentially 
and undersell Arab soap. To make matters worse, Shemen used the exemption from duty 
on the import of sesame seeds and olive oil to undercut the ability of the Arab peasants to 
sell their goods. 
The Nablus soap industry had flourished throughout the 19
th
 century given the 
unique geography of the area. The basic ingredient, olive oil, flourished in the central 
highlands, while qilw, the ashes of the barilla plant and a main ingredient of the alkaline 
sodium compound in soap, was obtained from Bedouins from across the Jordan River.
94
 
During the mandate, the industry began to suffer. Egypt, the main market for Palestinian 
soap, imposed extremely heavy duties on it. In addition to this, the Nabulsi brand 
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possessed no legal protection, which encouraged cheap counterfeits.
95
 During the 1920s, 
worldwide soap manufacturers started using caustic soda instead of qilw, making 
production cheaper everywhere. Furthermore, traditional methods of production such as 
animal power still used by Arabs could not compete with the duty free electric driven 
industrialized machinery imported by the Zionists. In 1929, Jaffa had 12 soap factories, 
but the number dropped to four by 1936.
96
 
To protect Shemen, the government increased custom duties on imported laundry 
soap which could compete with Shemen products from 15 per cent ad valorem to £7 per 
ton, around 23 per cent ad valorem and then to £10 per ton in 1927 and 1929, 
respectively.
97
 At the same time, the duties on all edible oils were increased by at least 
20%. The government went further than just protecting Shemen from foreign 
competition, and exempted from duty the importation of all seeds used in the production 
of oil. When it opened, Shemen already possessed nearly the same amount of capital as 
all 24 Nabulsi factories combined.
98
 The protection of the government helped further 
increase the company‟s economy of scale in the late 1920s.  
The activities of Shemen hurt other sectors of the Arab economy as well. The 
exemption of duties on sesame seeds hurt the Arab agriculturalists. Shemen claimed that 
the local product was of an inferior quality and therefore imported large quantities from 
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 In 1930, the British finally investigated this claim and found 
that this allegation was completely unfounded.
100
 At the same time, Shemen benefitted 
from olive oil from Syria that entered duty free. In the manufacturing of some olive oil, 
the company imported low quality oil from Syria, refined it, and then sold it back in Syria 
for a profit. By bypassing or by limiting relations with the Palestinian economy, Shemen 
further injured an already crippled domestic oil market. While many peasants of Palestine 
were affected, hundreds of fellaheen in the village of Rameh, who depended on the sale 
of their olive oil, went bankrupt.
101
 Ironically, this occurred around the same time that E. 
R. Sawer and the Department of Agriculture were encouraging Arabs in the central 
highlands to shift from grain to olives.
102
  
Partly because of Shemen‟s use of imports and refusal to use local goods, the 
local olive oil market nearly collapsed in 1930. Arab olive growers continuously 
petitioned the government to change its policy of protectionism towards Shemen. One 
read, “Shemen is importing duty free seeds…it mixes these seeds with olive oil and sells 
the produce for very cheap prices… Shemen is making it impossible for us to sell our 
pure oil.”103 In response to this petition, the government met with representatives of the 
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With protection against foreign soaps and oils and exemptions on importing 
sesame seeds and olive oil, Shemen was able to establish itself and flood both the Jewish 
and Arab marketplaces with cheap oil and soap products. It even began selling an edible 
oil that replaced samna, the traditional Arab cooking fat.
105
 While wealthier Arabs could 
still afford to use the more expensive Nabulsi soap, the fellaheen were forced to buy 
cheaper brands.
106
   
It must be noted that starting in 1931, the government began to increase duties on 
imported seeds and oils in order to protect Arab agriculture. By then though, it was too 
late to have a very large impact. Many fellaheen had been ruined by Shemen‟s policies 
during the 1920s. On top of that, the company was already sufficiently large enough to 
flood the Arab market and, to the chagrin of Arab and other Zionist oil producers, still 
played a significant role in dictating British tariff policies.
107
 In essence, as May Seikaly 
concludes, the tariff policy was not reversed, but, “…exceptions were made in order to 
prevent detriment of the agricultural community and impoverishment of the Arab 
sector.”108 
Shemen was undoubtedly a factor in the decline of Nabulsi soap, but the industry 
had been suffering throughout the 1920s, and Jewish competition was not the sole reason. 
The fact that British policies to a great extent provided for Shemen‟s success made the 
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company the largest symbol of the failings of the Arab sector and signified the 
confluence between British and Zionists goals. 
 
Nesher Cement 
With the Jewish National Home completely dependent on the ability to attract and 
house new immigrants, the Nesher Cement factory in Haifa became one of the 
cornerstones of Zionist industry, not only because of its ability to employ Jews, but the 
significance cement had in construction. Founded in 1923 with an initial investment of 
£225,000, Nesher became the largest private company in Palestine.
109
 The company first 
approached the government about exemptions from duty several months before starting 
production in 1925. The government made no changes given the lack of information 
regarding the price of Nesher cement and the impact that increasing the tariff on foreign 
cement from 20 piasters a ton would have on the consumer. 
Armed with the appropriate information, the company again petitioned the 
government in 1927. It claimed that although Nesher was producing a high-quality 
product at a decent price, it failed to conquer the Palestine market because of the high 
cost of rail transport and the deleterious effect of foreign dumping on prices.
110
 The 
company claimed that the common practice of countries which possessed a cement 
industry was to raise foreign tariffs, thus allowing their company to dominate the home 
market and then dump the remaining product on countries which lacked tariffs. Michael 
Polack, the president of the company, specifically pointed out the impact of Yugoslavian 
cement which received a subsidized rate on shipping costs. The company then dumped its 
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product in Palestine, thereby causing the costs of cement to plummet.
111
 Because of this, 
Nesher lost money in 1926. It wanted the tariff to be raised to 80 piastres a ton and 
argued that, in the long run, this would not hurt the consumer at all. He claimed that the 
strategy of the Yugoslavian cement company was to crush Nesher with low prices, and 
then dramatically raise prices when the competition was removed.
112
 
Lord Plumer sympathized with the industry and proposed, it seems somewhat 
arbitrarily, to raise the tariff to 50 piastres. The Palestine Economic Board rebuked the 
High Commissioner and stated that while 80 piastres seemed excessive, 50 would not 
achieve the desired goal.
113
 It claimed that a tariff of 60 piastres for 10 years would allow 
the company to compete. At the end of 1927, the government did indeed implement a 60 
piaster duty. This level of protection proved insufficient to aid the company, and in 1929, 
the government raised the tariff to 85 piastres to address competition from Italian 
cement.
114
 During the 1930s, the company began making large profits and was able to 
enlarge the factory. In 1935, Nesher produced 300,000 tons of cement compared to 
51,000 tons in 1926.
115
 Sir Hope Simpson stated, 
The sole good reason in favour of the tariff is that it enables the Company to 
employ 260 Jews… and 130 Arabs… This argument is not convincing to the 
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The tariffs on cement occasioned the largest complaints from the Arabs not only 
because the protection lasted well over a decade, but because the rise in the use of cement 
also challenged Arab laborers. Cement replaced stone in construction, which led to the 
unemployment of many skilled Arab stone masons and stone-dressers.
117
 It also greatly 
affected the owners of stone quarries, most of whom were Arabs. Nesher and its cement 




By 1936, the Zionists controlled almost all the few natural resources Palestine 
possessed. They had gained some of the most fertile land in the country through land 
sales such as the one involving the Jezreel valley in the 1920s, which helped solidify the 
continuity of the so-called „N‟ shape settlement pattern. Other land purchases were 
concentrated along the Mediterranean coast to an extent that by the mid-1930s, Zionists 
owned more citrus groves than Arabs. In addition, the government granted Zionists the 
vital resources of the Dead Sea, hydro-electricity of the Jordan River, and the Huleh 
Valley. 
The concessions drew the ire of many members of the British parliament and they 
questioned the wisdom of giving a minority such an economic advantage, especially 
when the mandate had been established to protect the interest of all the residents of 
Palestine. Of course, the loudest voices of discontent came from the Arabs, who 
vigorously protested these concessions through boycotts, strikes, petitions, and the 
presses. Leading Arabs brought these complaints up during the 1929 Commission 
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hearings, but the subsequent report dismissed them.
118
 It responded by claiming that the 
development of these resources would help bring jobs and further development to the 
country regardless to whom the concessions were given. During the Peel Commission, 
Jamal Bey al-Husayni used the concessions as evidence that the British had ignored their 
obligations to the Arabs in favor of the Balfour Declaration.  
The histories of all three concessions are very complex and span both the 
Ottoman and the mandate periods. In the late 19
th
 century, the Sultan allowed 
entrepreneurs to apply for various concessions for construction projects and resources. 
The government granted concessions for building railroads, most notably the Hijaz and 
the Jerusalem-Jaffa railways. While many of the concessions throughout the empire were 
given to foreigners, several in Palestine were given to Ottoman citizens. In 1913, 
Mehmed V granted three Ottoman subjects a concession to mine for bromide in the Dead 
Sea. That same year, he granted Euripides Mavrommatis multiple concessions to provide 
water and electricity to Jaffa and Jerusalem. Other Ottomans, including several 
Palestinians, had been attempting to acquire their own concessions. This section will 
focus on the competition for the previous few concessions, how the British eventually 
decided to give them all to the Zionists and how the development of these resources 
affected the Arabs. 
 
The Rutenberg Concession 
Rutenberg‟s poles are nothing but guillotines. In Rutenberg‟s scheme 
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No single project signified the development of Zionism in Palestine during the 
1920s as much as the Rutenberg concession. Pinhas Rutenberg, a Russian Jew, had lived 
in Palestine since 1906 and had helped the British government survey the northern border 
with Syria. He was greatly influenced by his training as an engineer and his time along 
the Jordan River and Lake Tiberias. By 1917, he had developed a plan for hydroelectric 
stations which would power all of Palestine. The Zionist Organization quickly approved 
of the proposal as it would not only lead to increased Jewish employment and therefore 
immigration, but widespread electricity would help to boost production in the Jewish 
colonies.
120
 Although the eventual concession greatly disappointed Rutenberg in its 
actual scope, it was more than enough to give the Zionists a pivotal economic advantage. 
Rutenberg originally sought to exploit the waters of all the rivers in and around 
Palestine including those in Lebanon, but his dreams were quickly shattered. The French 
would not give him the Litani, and several of the major tributaries of the Jordan fell 
outside of Palestine. The British also limited his access to land in Transjordan and 
refused to allow him to sell energy there. Nevertheless, Rutenberg was able to 
successfully monopolize the water within Palestine. His scheme was broken down into 
two parts granting him exclusive access to both the „Auja River (Yarkon) and the Jordan 
River. The government also promised to annul any previous concession which might 
interfere. The „Auja scheme was approved in 1921 and the Jordan River five years later. 
During the 1920s, Rutenberg quickly built power plants to serve Tel Aviv and Haifa, 
providing Zionist industry with much needed power. Progress on his plant at the 
confluence of the Jordan and the Yarmouk moved more slowly because of negotiations, 
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but it opened in 1932. Throughout this entire process, the British continued to believe that 
the Rutenberg concession would help unite Jews and Arabs in Palestine. 
With a political compromise between the British and the Arabs floundering 
throughout the 1920s, the hope was that economic development spurred by Zionist 
investment would improve Arab attitudes towards Zionism. Sara Reguer claims that the 
1921 Jaffa Revolt only strengthened this view. The British hoped that quick economic 
development would diffuse tensions. Though apprehensive of Zionist political objectives, 
the government increased support for Jewish economic development. Shuckburgh wrote,   
…We are always trying to divert the attention of the Zionists from political to 
industrial activities, and preaching to them… that their best chance of reconciling 
the Arabs to the Zionist Policy is to show them the practical advantages accruing 
to the country from Zionist enterprise. For these reasons we have supported and 
encouraged Mr. Rutenberg‟s projects and I submit that we must continue to 
support and encourage them…121 
 
To assuage the fears of the Arabs, Rutenberg publicly played down his connection 
to the Zionists. He distanced himself from the Zionist organizations and continuously 
preached how his scheme would become a symbol of Arab-Jewish unity. British officials 
even repeated this theme during parliamentary debates on the issue, although it was 
impossible for Rutenberg to hide his strong Zionist tendencies. He was one of the 
cofounders of the Haganah and the vast majority of his funding came from various 
Zionist organizations. He also successfully set up a separate holding company so that the 
Palestine Electric Company would always remain in Zionist hands.
122
 For its part, The 
Zionist Organization used all of its pull to promote the scheme. In 1921, Prime Minister 
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Lloyd George asked Dr. Weizmann what he wanted in the way of immigration. Instead of 
a number, Weizmann responded with a demand for the Rutenberg concession.
123
  
 The scheme received a great deal of help from British officials as well, the two 
most prominent being Sir Herbert Samuel and Winston Churchill.
124
 Understanding that 
there would be opposition to the concession, Samuel kept all the negotiations private.  
After 1921, he became more apprehensive of the project as he wanted the Arabs to 
consent to it. Winston Churchill was the one who eventually convinced Samuel that Arab 
approval, which would never be forthcoming, was not necessary to advance the 
concession. In the end, the High Commissioner agreed to many of the far-reaching 
clauses of the scheme, such as the right to expropriate land. Churchill also staunchly 
defended the scheme in London and he fought for it against vehement opposition in 
parliament. He not only defended Rutenberg‟s character, but he won over his detractors 
by explaining what the project meant for Palestine‟s development and the importance of 
keeping Britain‟s pledge to the Zionists.125 
 The concession was extremely far-reaching. Rutenberg was granted exclusive 
rights to the waters of the „Auja and the Jordan, therefore blocking any future Arab 
development of the region. On top of that, he was allowed to expropriate Arab land if it 
was needed for his development. The terms of the concession greatly constrained the 
power of the municipalities. Thus, when the Jaffa municipality asked for access to the 
„Auja River for electricity, the government said no.126 The archives prove that before 
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approving any new project, the Colonial Office had to consider whether or not it would 
violate the concession. The Arabs understood that with a monopoly over water access and 
electricity, the Zionists had gained the upper hand in the Palestinian economy. Arabs in 
Jaffa and Haifa protested, boycotted Jewish goods, and even sent a delegation to London 
to express their grievances. While Arab protests to the concession were mostly ignored 
by the government, the anger was palpable. The Arab Higher Committee and the 
Muslim-Christian Society of Nazareth both sent angry letters to the High Commissioner. 
The Arab presses exploded with anger.
127
 One article in Filastin stated that Rutenberg, 
“is intent on taking our land… getting hold of our resources and denying us everything 
that is rightfully ours.”128  
While a success for Zionism, the concession left the Colonial Office and the 
government of Palestine with a black eye. Not only had it provoked the Arabs, but the 
international community derided the government‟s favoritism towards Rutenberg in 
context of the Mavrommatis concession. Euripides Mavrommatis, a “concession 
hunter,”129 received one from the Sultan for the generation and distribution of 
hydroelectricity in Jerusalem right before the outbreak of World War I.
130
 Due to the war, 
the scheme remained in abeyance. In order for this concession to be economically viable, 
Mavrommatis needed access to the „Auja River, but Rutenberg‟s concession blocked this. 
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Mavrommatis tried through several meetings with Rutenberg to come to an 
agreement, but the latter refused and would only offer to buy him out with a paltry sum. 
For its part, the Colonial Office fully supported Rutenberg and prevented Mavrommatis 
from redeeming his concession by delaying communications and exploiting minute 
technicalities in the text of the contract.
131
 Utterly frustrated, Mavrommatis sought the aid 
of the Greek government. Under the aegis of a state, Greece took Great Britain to the 
International Court of Justice in 1924 and 1925. Mavrommatis, fully understanding that 
the British would not allow him to proceed with the concession, wanted compensation. 
While these cases mostly revolved around whether or not the court had jurisdiction, the 
court eventually struck down Rutenberg‟s ability to annul previously granted 
concessions, denied Mavrommatis compensation, and ordered that the British allow him 
to fulfill his scheme. The British still had no intention of allowing Mavrommatis to make 
any progress. With it publicly known that the government opposed him, Mavrommatis 
quickly lost all his financial backing. In 1928, he eventually sold his concession to the 
Zionist owned Jerusalem Power Company, therefore ensuring Zionist control over the 
entire Palestine power grid. The negative international publicity from the Mavrommatis 
case caused Sir John Shuckburgh to call the Rutenberg concession “a European 
scandal.”132  
 Barbara Smith questions the economic importance of the Rutenberg concession 
and claims that it was more about the symbolism of Zionism. She argues that since 
Rutenberg did not receive as much of the concession as he wanted, this limited the scope 
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of his production and that his exclusive claim to the Jordan precluded irrigation in some 
Jewish colonies.
133
 While Smith makes some valid points, she completely underestimated 
the importance it had on industry. By 1936, the Palestine Electric Company had 653 
transformers and reached 66,000 customers, 1/3
rd
 of which were industries.
134
 
Rutenberg‟s electricity single-handily allowed the important Zionist industries in Haifa 
and Tel Aviv to greatly increase production. Of course the Rutenberg power plants 
symbolized Zionism, but they allowed for the growth of industry which the Zionists used 
to facilitate the absorption of large numbers of immigrants by the 1930s. 
 
The Huleh Swamp Concession 
By the mid-19
th
 century, the Ghawarna, a semipastoralist Bedouin tribe, settled 
around the swamps and marshes of the Huleh Valley. The Zionists and the British viewed 
them as backward and wasting the potential economic resources of the land, as did most 
natives. The Huleh area was the second most fertile region of Palestine after the Jezreel 
Valley. It could potentially grow grain and fruit with its deep alluvial soils and many 
natural springs for irrigation.
135
  
The economy of the Ghawarna consisted of water buffalo herding, the growing of 
rice in the areas adjacent to the marshes, and mat weaving using the reeds of the swamp. 
Even though plagued with a high mortality rate from malaria, the tribe used the resources 
as rationally as possible. By the early 1930s, they owned over 5,000 water buffalos and 
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the surrounding Arab and Jewish communities widely used their papyrus mats.
136
 The 
Ottoman government and wealthy Arabs viewed the Ghawarna as a stumbling block for 
the development of the region as they wanted to drain the swamp for its rich farmland. 
During the Egyptian occupation of the 1830s, the local Arabs had used explosives to 
destroy rocks that had been preventing the marshes from draining.
137
 This led to a 
temporary boon in farming, but it was not a long-term solution as the Banat Ya‟qub 
Bridge upstream continued to limit the flow of water. The Sultan claimed Huleh as jiftlik, 
private lands owned by the Sultan, by the end of the 19
th
 century and was intent on 
developing it. Initially, government surveyors and engineers pinpointed the problems and 
began attempting to fix them. They widened the river at the bridge, thus draining 
thousands of dunams. However, due to lack of resources, the Ottoman government 
eventually halted work and put the land up for a concession.  
The Zionist Executive began to show interest in acquiring the land in 1906, and 
sent an engineer to investigate. The government likewise saw the Zionists as a possible 
partner in draining the swamps given their technical experience and supposed wealth,
138
 
but eventually, the Ottoman government gave the concession to two Beirutis, Muhammad 
Beyhum and Michael Sursock. The concession remained in abeyance due to the war. In 
1918, the sultan then approved the transfer of the concession to the Syro-Ottoman 
Agricultural Company led by Salim Bey Salam. That same year, British soldiers marched 
up from Jerusalem and conquered northern Palestine, thus inhibiting further progress. 
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 The concession resurfaced once the civil administration was established but faced 
two serious threats. First, as was the case for all concessions in Palestine, the British were 
unsure whether or not it was valid until the Lausanne Protocols of 1923 forced them to 
recognize it. Second, during preliminary discussions between the French and the British, 
the Huleh Valley was allocated to Syria. In the end though, it became part of Palestine 
after pressure from the Zionists, who not only desired the swamp, but sought to preserve 
several Jewish settlements which lay just north of the valley, including the one where 
Joseph Trumpeldor was killed.
139
 The High Commissioner was very apprehensive about 
the concession as it would alienate land from the government, but he also feared that it 
would conflict with part of the Rutenberg scheme which called for Huleh to be used to 
store water from the Jordan. 
Salam began having severe problems funding the project immediately after the 
British recognized the concession. As the Zionists remained interested in the land, he 
entered into negotiations with them to sell it. Dr. Weizmann offered £75,000 while Salam 
wanted £150,000 and they seemed to have reached a compromise at £90,000.
140
 The 
Zionist Organization then completed a survey of the valley, which stated the costs of 
draining the concession area would be completely uneconomical. In order for the 
drainage scheme to make any sense, the government would have to be willing to sell the 
surrounding land as well. Salam later claimed that the Zionists pressured other potential 
buyers from making an offer so that he would go bankrupt and eventually the Zionists 
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would get the concession at a much lower price, but there is no basis for this claim.
141
 It 
is most likely that the extraordinary cost scared away any prospective buyers. 
While the Huleh issue remained a thorn in the side of the government during the 
late 1920s, particularly whether Salam or the government would receive rent from the 
land, the situation became much more serious in 1930. Warwick Tyler adroitly puts the 
Huleh concession into a larger context. The Hope Simpson Report and the Passfield 
White Paper of 1930 both admonished the government for the lack of development of 
state lands and pushed for action. Jerusalem then had a new incentive to have the area 
drained as quickly as possible to placate these reports, but by this time, it had become 
clear that Salam would not be able to muster the necessary funding. 
By 1932, the entire concession was at a standstill. By then, Salam did not have the 
ability to invest further and was content to continue collecting rent.
142
 Lewis French, 
Director of Development, suggested that Jerusalem should expropriate the concession, 
but of course the government had no intention of investing its own revenue into the 
project.
143
 Additionally, if the government were to expropriate the concession, Rutenberg 
would gain an exclusive right to the water of Huleh just as he had the Jordan.
144
  The 
British wanted the Zionists to have the land, but they also preferred that it be used for the 
settlement of immigrants so as to divert Zionist efforts from buying Arab land. Therefore, 
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the government planned on allowing Salam to default and having the Zionists, through 
the Palestine Land Development Company, buy the concession at auction.
145
 
Spurred by the emerging crisis of massive migration from Germany, the Zionists 
viewed Huleh with new importance. With default imminent, Salam reentered negotiations 
with the Zionists and the government eventually allowed the transfer of the concession to 
the PLDC. The High Commissioner promised to bless the arrangement and even sell the 
surrounding land if a reserve in the concession area were established for the Arabs. He 
tried to assuage Arab anger by stating that Zionist development of Huleh would support 
not only Jews, but also Arabs as the PLDC agreed to reserve 15,772 dunams of land for 
1,000 Arab families.
146
 By the time of the 1936 Revolt, the Zionists had made little 
progress on the drainage project, but the acquisition of the Huleh Valley was a significant 
boost to the National Jewish Home and a serious blow to the Palestinian nationalist 
cause. The eventual draining of the swamp not only destroyed the lifestyle of the 
Ghawarna, but the area became a fortified zone with Jewish settlements ringing the 
northern extent of the valley. 
The Arabs and the Palestinian press greatly supported Salam‟s effort to develop 
the land. When rumors spread across the country in 1930 that the Zionists were trying to 
“steal” the concession from him, the Palestinian press praised the potential of Huleh for 
the Arab cause. “The enterprise is therefore a national Arab scheme which calls upon 
every Palestinian Arab to assist it materially and morally so as to enable us to fight 
economically the Zionists who… are about to lay hands upon all the important resources 









of the country.”147 Once it had become clear that the Zionists were indeed granted the 
concession, the Arab press viciously attacked the British government as well. Filastin 
claimed that the transfer of the concession to the Zionists amounted to the government‟s 
“manipulation of Arab land and neglect in its destruction.”148  
The Arabs viewed the Huleh concession as another step towards the Zionists 
gobbling up all their land. The presence of multiple Zionist settlements greatly changed 
the surrounding environment and served as a reminder of encroaching Zionism. Although 
the draining did not start until after the establishment of the State of Israel, it was clear to 
the Arabs of Huleh, and in particularly the Ghawarna, that their way of life would come 
to an end soon.  
Clearly, it was not the government‟s fault that the Arab concessionaires were 
unable to drain the swamp: the British had given them ample time. Tyler claims that the 
British went out of their way to accommodate them in order not to seem to be biased in 
favor of the Zionists. The government even made sure to guarantee land for the original 
inhabitants, but the Arabs saw the situation differently. When the British transferred the 
concession to the Zionists, the Arabs had lost a major development project. They 
wrongfully blamed the Zionists for Salam‟s failures. Given the long-standing interest the 
Zionists had for the valley, the Arabs concluded that there was a conspiracy between the 
Jews and the government to take their land. In essence, the Huleh Valley was much more 
of a symbolic loss to the Arabs than a material one.  Yet it was a gigantic reminder of the 
changing power dynamics in the country. 
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The Dead Sea Mining Concession 
The Dead Sea Concession has a curious history, and when we come 
to a consideration of the course of action that has been taken, it can 
only be regarded as an outrage on every principle of sound 




 The developer of the Palestine Potash Company, Moshe Novomeysky, always 
tried to emphasize that Palestine had been devoid of any development before the coming 
of the Zionists and that it was they who “made the desert bloom.” He claimed that the 
Arabs never attempted to exploit the Dead Sea, and he carried out an “…act of building 
ab initio something where nothing had changed since the Almighty‟s first creation…”150 
In fact, the Arabs had been developing the region for decades, and, like the Zionists, they 
claimed the right to develop the Dead Sea. 
Several Ottomans, including Arabs, attempted to cultivate the Dead Sea. The first 
concession for the exploitation of the resource was granted by the Sultan in 1911 to three 
Ottoman subjects, yet was cancelled in 1915.
151
 In 1923, Musa Kadhim Pasha al-Husayni 
applied for a concession but to no avail. A third example of an Ottoman citizen trying to 
gain access to the Dead Sea was Ibrahim Hazboun, who returned to his native Palestine 
from Haiti in 1913 in order to take advantage of the new economic opportunities 
provided for Arabs following the 1908 Revolution. Having learned about the economic 
resources of the Dead Sea, he used personal connections to gain a position managing the 
transport of grain and military equipment across the body of water in 1915. Apparently, 
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he assumed that as part of the bargain he would be granted a concession to mine the sea 
at the end of the war.
152
 The British allowed Hazboun to continue managing the 
enterprise so as not to disturb the movement of goods. He claimed that the Director of 
Commerce and Industry had promised him the concession once the mandate was 
ratified.
153
 Because of this, Hazboun took out loans to invest in his ferries, but with no 
concession in sight, he was near bankruptcy by 1921. That same year, Moshe 
Novomeysky bought him out with the same intention of using the transport business as a 
stepping stone towards gaining the concession.  
Born in Siberia in 1873, Novomeysky was a German trained mining engineer. In 
1906, through conversations with the famed Zionist botanist Otto Warburg, Novomeysky 
realized that the chemical makeup of the salts of the Dead Sea were extremely similar to 
those in Siberia, the area which he knew well. After visiting Palestine in 1911, he moved 
there permanently nine years later. Novomeysky established a makeshift laboratory on 
the land he received with the transport business and carried out chemical and geological 
experiments there for the next decade.   
Novomeysky came to Palestine not only as a potential entrepreneur but out of a 
devout desire to build the Jewish National Home. He said that, “the ideology of Zionism, 
the concept of the return of my nation to its old homeland had found its place in my 
heart… and by the Balfour Declaration the British government had… given those 
emotions a powerful new stimulus.”154 He and his family settled in Gedera where he 
established a large and prosperous farm. He chose this colony not only because it was the 
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first settlement of Russian Jews, but because his family had an emotional connection to it. 
While visiting Palestine in 1914, Novomeysky‟s father had spent Passover in the 
settlement where the “Zionist idea awakened in him.”155 
From 1920-1925, he continuously lobbied both the governments in Jerusalem and 
London for the concession. At the same time, others had also been petitioning the British. 
In 1923 at the behest of the Colonial Office, Novomeysky teamed up with Major Tulloch 
who had contacted the government in 1918 about the concession. The pair complimented 
each other very nicely. Tulloch lacked funding but as a prominent Scot, his presence 
would help deflect anti-Zionist criticism. In addition to Novomeysky and Hazboun, 
nearly half a dozen other parties had shown an interest in the concession by the mid-
1920s. Until the British finally offered Novomeysky the concession in 1927, the 
discussions between the Colonial Office, the government of Palestine, and the 
prospective concessionaires on the subject were so drawn out and contentious that 
Shuckburgh exclaimed, “I wish that sea were truly dead.”156 
 The tumultuous consequences from the Rutenberg and Mavrommatis concessions 
had caused the government to move very slowly regarding the Dead Sea as not to even 
appear as discriminating against anyone or being biased towards any group. Several 
interested parties contacted the government, but the Colonial Office continued to delay 
the process until 1925 when it officially called for tenders. None of the original offers 
pleased the government, so in 1926, it sent out another call for bids. The British received 
four main proposals. One came from Maitland Edwards and Major Douglas Henry, or the 
so-called Australian group. Major Henry was an Australian engineer who had fought in 
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Palestine during the war. He learned about the potential of the Dead Sea while in the 
country and contacted the British about a concession in 1917. His partner, Edwards, was 
a wealthy Englishman who had bought the concession from one of the original Ottoman 
concessionaries in 1915 without knowing that it had been cancelled. Given that the group 
had no financial backing, the British government would have completely discounted their 
bid if it had not been for the possibility that if the group felt slighted, it could use Henry‟s 
Australian citizenship to force an international court case.  
A second bid came from W. H. Tottie, the manager of a major Canadian trading 
company who headed what was labeled the Bicknell group. While their bid gave the 
government the best terms, it had become clear by 1927 that they were unable to muster 
enough funding. Barbara Smith claims that the Bicknell group was the only competition 
for Novomeysky, but there was a third bid which the government took very seriously.
157
 
 This tender came from Dr. Thomas Norton, a well-respected chemist who had 
written at length about potash extraction and had spent years in France working in the 
industry.
158
 He also invented an innovative technique for extracting potash and other 
minerals which would drastically lower the price for the British.
159
 By all accounts, the 
Norton bid was much more attractive to the government than the one put forth by 
Novomeysky and Tulloch. Norton promised an output of 100,000 tons of potassium 
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chloride by the third year compared to Novomeysky‟s 10,000.160 In addition, Norton 
promised the government a larger share of the profits.
161
 In the end, the government 
decided to grant Novomeysky the concession, citing his extensive knowledge of the 
chemical and geological composition of the Dead Sea. The fact that he possessed Zionist 
financial support was also a major benefit. 
 Pro-Arab British politicians and notables attacked this decision in the presses and 
in the House of Commons. The loudest voice heard outside of parliament was that of 
Robert Gordon Canning, who was known for his anti-Semitism and support of Arab 
Nationalism. He claimed that Novomeysky received the concession because of Leo 
Amery‟s pro-Zionist views and that if this injustice were allowed to stand, the Middle 
East would explode with anger.
162
 He used the concession as a way to attack the entire 
policy of the British in Palestine and added that justice for the Arab inhabitants must be 
the paramount concern of the British, not the development of Zionism. 
 Several politicians roundly criticized the concession during a parliamentary 
hearing in 1928. They attacked Novomeysky for everything from his supposed pro-
Bolshevik stance to his rumored cooperation with the German potash monopoly, although 
neither of these allegations was true. Baron Islington stated that the British should act as a 
trustee and needed to make sure that the terms of the concession were agreed to by the 
entire population of Palestine and Trans-Jordan. The British had the responsibility to 
“…mete out even justice and equality in all matters and interests, political, social or 
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economic to the people of Palestine as a whole and not to any minority…”163 The idea 
that the British were not protecting the economic interests of the Arabs was a common 
theme. Lord Danesford stated that the British, by granting the concession to Zionists, 
were ignoring the needs of the Arabs.
164
 
 Obviously, the Palestinian Arabs were enraged with the decision to grant another 
pivotal concession to the Zionists. In addition to numerous articles attacking the British 
for their decision, the Palestine Arab Congress wrote to London denouncing it. In one 
letter, the Congress reminded the High Commissioner the damage that had been done by 
the Rutenberg concession; of how it “sunk deep in the heart” of the Arabs and that they 
needed “a real counter-grant to neutralize its very unwholesome effect rather than 
granting another concession of this dimension to another Zionist.”165 It went on to 
erroneously argue that the first one to apply for the concession was Musa Kadhim Pasha 
al-Husayni, who said that he was willing to abdicate his rights to the concession as long 
as the Dead Sea were developed for the benefit of all of Palestine, not just one section.
166
 
 Clearly, the most serious objection was Novomeysky‟s relationship with Zionism. 
During the Parliamentary Debate of 1928, Lord Islington claimed that during a Zionist 
meeting, Dr. Chaim Weizmann stated that the Zionist Organization had obtained the 
Dead Sea concession, not just Novomeysky.
167
 While there is no evidence to support that 
he made this specific claim, Weizmann did enthusiastically support Novomeysky‟s bid 
and used all his pull within the Colonial Office to influence the decision. He used his 
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reputation as a chemist to laud Novomeysky‟s scientific skills.168 At the end of 1926, Dr. 
Weizmann wrote a letter to Amery about the Dead Sea concession. He urged that 
Novomeysky “not be pushed into the background in favor of other interests.”169 
Furthermore, he stated that the development of the Dead Sea was vital for the 
development of the Jewish National Home.  
While Weizmann clearly advocated for Novomeysky, the latter was likewise 
dedicated to the success of Zionism as we have already seen. In 1929, he started 
negotiations for funding with Sir Alfred Mond. Novomeysky was desperate for funding 
at that time and even though he had received numerous promises from American Jews 
that they would back him, he needed one large sponsor to prove that he had the ability to 
finance the first stage of the scheme. Mond offered support, but in exchange he wanted in 
essence to receive a majority share of the company. The Jewish Colonial Trust urged 
Novomeysky to take the offer because there were no other options.
170
  Novomeysky was 
willing to accept these terms if Mond agreed to use Jewish labor and reserve a permanent 
seat on the Board of Directors for the Jewish Agency to ensure that Zionist interests 
would be looked after even in the distant future.
171
 Mond refused, but eventually, 
prominent American Jews such as Louis Brandeis were able to procure enough funding.  
 The Palestine Potash Company was founded in 1929. This constituted a major 
victory for both the British and the Zionists. During the early 20
th
 century, the Germans 
had a monopoly on potash, a core raw ingredient for fertilizer. The British relied heavily 
on this source and during World War I, the end of German potash deliveries destroyed 
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Britain‟s fertilizer industry.172 London therefore took a special interest in the 
development of the Dead Sea. The government was clearly not going to spend the money 
to develop the site and instead used the Zionists as their “agents for development.”173 The 
British viewed them as technically and financially the best suited, and considered them to 
be loyal to their interests. The collusion between the two groups is best seen in the 
makeup of the company. The PPC was a British company registered in London with a 
British chairman but run by the Zionists. Just as Haifa granted the British easy 
accessibility to oil, the Dead Sea granted them a large source of potash. They greatly 




For the Zionists, the granting of the Dead Sea concession completed the 
triumvirate of Zionist development: heavy industry in Haifa, Rutenberg hydroelectricity, 
and Dead Sea minerals. This is what Jacob Norris calls, “the Zionist Industrial 
Complex.”175 The Rutenberg power plants generated electricity which ran the factories in 
Haifa and the operations of the Palestine Potash Company. The Haifa factories produced 
the necessary materials, such as Nesher cement, for further development and jobs. The 
Dead Sea minerals were the largest source of revenue. All of this though depended on the 







                                                          
172
 Norris, “Development in Palestine,” 145-46. 
173
 Ibid, 155. 
174
 Ibid, 155-61. 
175






I [Sir John Chancellor] have been a great deal in South Africa. There, 
there are two standards of living; the white and the black; and there 
too the problem [of a wage that would be acceptable for both groups] 
has not been solved. If you ask me to solve it in Palestine as between 
the Jews and the Arabs, you are asking me to perform an economic 




The government‟s policy towards labor was multifaceted. It had a commitment to 
both the British government and Palestine‟s Treasury to conduct works as cheaply as 
possible. On the other hand, the British had a commitment to the development of the 
Jewish National Home to hire Jews and often used public works programs to alleviate 
unemployment in the Jewish sector. As the government was the single largest employer, 
the Jewish and Arab communities competed fiercely for jobs in the Public Works 
Department. Both sides thought of themselves as the “sons of the country” and argued 
that they deserved the bulk of the jobs. In addition, each community claimed that the 
government favored the other. Making up around 20% of the population, the Zionists 
argued that they deserved a proportion of the jobs equal to that of their contribution to the 
revenue of the country, about 40% in the early 1930s. The Arabs on the other hand 
argued that about 50% of the budget was being spent on defense and other projects that 
solely benefitted the Jews. Therefore, Arabs deserved the jobs as they were subsidizing 
Zionist development.  
During the 1920s, the largest complaint of the Arabs was that Jews received much 
higher wages. Although each government department could establish its own wage scale, 
most paid unskilled Jewish labor more than that of the unskilled Arab labor. The DPW 
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hired locally for projects and most of the time, it made sure that the labor force was 
homogenous. Jews were hired for works near Jewish colonies and Arabs for those near 
their own villages. This allowed the government to pay separate wages based on different 
standards of living. The Arab wage was based on the fact that not only was the standard 
of living of the fellaheen lower than the Jews, but the Arab peasants were also farmers.  
The government therefore viewed public works jobs as just supplemental income for 
them. Throughout the 1920s, the government continued to misunderstand the precarious 
position of the fellaheen and the extremely high rate of Arab unemployment. On the other 
hand, through the pressure of Zionists and labor organizations, the government offered 
even unskilled and nonunionized Jewish labor wages appropriate for a European standard 
of living. The 1928 Wage Commission found that unskilled laborers were grouped into 
one of four categories. (See Table 2.) 
The Wage Commission of 1928 was sent to examine multiple aspects of wages in 
Palestine, one of those being whether or not a minimum wage should be introduced, the 




Table 2. Wages for Unskilled Labor. Report of the Wage Commission of 1928. CO 
733/152/57204. 
Unskilled Labor by classification 
Arab Rural 120-150 mils Jewish non-Union 150-200 mils 
Arab Urban 140-170 mils Jewish Union 250-300 mils 
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 The committee voted against the idea, stating that it was premature in Palestine. They 
found that it would be impossible to enforce this in the private sector and would greatly 
increase the costs of labor for public works. It also found that the Arabs were not 
sufficiently well organized to make sure that such a wage was enforced. For example, 
Jewish labor had long used strikes as a method to achieve concessions from employers. 
In the context of Arab labor, strikes were political and not at all economic.
178
 Until Arabs 
understood labor methods such as strikes and bargaining, there was no use implementing 
such a measure from above. It recommended that the government take steps to help 
organize Arab labor so that a minimum wage could be implemented in the future. Lord 




The fact that the committee recommended teaching Arabs modern labor 
techniques ran completely counter to the government‟s policy towards Arab labor. The 
British wanted to preserve traditional Palestinian social relations. There was a fear that if 
they empowered laborers, it would overthrow traditional patronage links with the 
effendis, tribal sheikhs, and mukhtars, the village leaders, and therefore cause further 
instability for a society already in flux. The idea of a minimum wage continued to pop up 
throughout the 1930s, but the need to protect the society prevented its implementation.
180
 
The British also hoped that this policy would convince the traditional elites to cooperate 
politically.  
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The British relied on mukhtars and tribal sheikhs to recruit for public works 
projects near their villages. These local leaders decided which hamulas, or clans, and 
individuals would receive jobs. In addition to that, the British gave some mukhtars the 
authority to distribute pay.
181
 There were even instances in which these elites were able to 
dictate the terms of construction to the district commissioners. The government also 
made sure that Arab laborers could not start identifying themselves as a distinct class. 
Generally, Arab unions were not recognized. Even the more liberal Railway Department 
made sure that Arab workers did not organize. On public works, the government hired 
workers on a temporary basis. The fear was that if the government hired workers on a 
long-term contract, this would contribute to wide-scale urban migration and the 
weakening of social bonds. Some employment was extremely short term. For example, 
dockworkers at Haifa harbor were recruited for one day at a time.  
With an ever increasing number of Arabs seeking employment in the coastal cities 
while losing their social bonds to the villages, the government began attempting to attach 
these workers to urban notables. The effendis “exerted pressure on the workers for loyalty 
without granting them the advantages of either material gain or continuing social 
accommodation.”182 The workers thus became pawns in the competition between the 
Husaynis and their opponents. 
The government excluded the Arab sector from many labor laws. While the 
British afforded Jewish labor limited protection through legislation, they feared that if it 
were extended to the Arabs, it would not only cost much more, but would create social 
strife. Sir Herbert Samuel wanted to enact a workers compensation ordinance in 1925. 
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The Colonial Office shelved the idea until 1928 when it allowed a watered down version 
to pass. This narrow interpretation excluded casual workers which were the vast majority 
of the Arabs.
183
 In essence, as Rachelle Taqqu points out, British policies towards Arab 
labor were based on ideals of social stability and fiscal conservatism.   
  Starting in the 1930s, the terms of the battle over labor shifted from wages to the 
proportion of workers. Zionist pressure succeeded in forcing the British to offer Jews a 
guaranteed proportion of all public works jobs, although Jewish labor never felt that it 
received its fair share. The government did indeed prefer the cheaper Arabs, though 
works were directed towards Zionists during times of economic depression. The Zionists 
continued to argue that they deserved a proportion of the jobs equal to their contribution 
to the country‟s revenue. These complaints finally led to a change in policy in 1931, set 
out in Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald‟s letter to Dr. Chaim Weizmann, referred to 
by the Arabs as the MacDonald Black Paper. In it, the Prime Minister annulled several 
policies adopted following the Passfield White Paper such as the need to limit Jewish 
immigration. The letter addressed two issues regarding labor. First, it officially accepted 
the Jewish Agency‟s “principle of preferential and indeed exclusive, employment of 
Jewish labor by Jewish organizations,”184 but more importantly, MacDonald affirmed the 
right of “…Jewish labor to a due share of the employment available, taking into account 
Jewish contributions to public revenue…”185  
The decision on what the actual proportion should be was very hard to pin down. 
Following negotiations between the Treasury and the Jewish Agency, the government 
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declared that Jews should be given 30 to 33 per cent of the work on all public works 
jobs.
186
 In fact, the number often fell short of that given the diverse conditions and 
locations of the government‟s programs. Nevertheless, the fact that the government 
officially accepted this policy added “to the Arabs‟ feelings of insecurity and legalized 
what they considered the cause of their oppression.”187 In essence, the Arabs tussled with 
the government over wages in the 1920s, but in the 1930s, they had to fight just for jobs.  
 
Haifa Harbor Construction: an Example of Discriminatory Wages 
The Haifa Harbor presents a unique case study in the complexities of wages in 
public works projects. As we have already established, the British used the requirement 
to pay Jews a European wage to circumvent international bids for the construction of the 
harbor. The government would also hire Arabs for the project, as they were the majority 
of the country, and to keep costs down. A major problem was caused by the fact that 
during the construction period, Jews and Arabs would be working side by side, which 
would make paying one group more than the other extremely difficult. Arabs would riot 
if they found out Jews were being paid much more for the same job. Originally, the 
government intended to steer Jewish labor to skilled or semiskilled jobs which would 
allow them to be paid more without obvious discrimination. This was a standard practice 
on mixed projects in both the public and private sectors. In this case though, the Zionists 
vigorously objected to it. According to government plans, the first 18 months of the 
harbor construction would consist entirely of unskilled jobs. The Zionists refused to wait 
for their proportion of the labor, especially since Jewish taxes were contributing to the 
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construction. On top of that, they wanted to assure that all skill grades were available for 
Jews. 
 The government decided that the only way of allowing Jews to be hired for 
unskilled labor and not to discriminate against Arabs would be to create a single 
minimum wage.
188
 Sir John Chancellor decided that this wage had to be lower than what 
Jews would normally receive, otherwise it would bankrupt the country.
189
 Instead, he 
argued that the wage should be between that of the Arabs and Jews at around 150 mils. 
This would allow the standard of living for the Arabs to rise, while at the same time 
making labor affordable. The Zionists were outraged. They exclaimed that at that salary, 
no Jew could afford to take the job. They argued that the common wage should be 200 
mils.
190
 The High Commissioner was in quite a predicament. He needed to pay everyone 
equally, but the government could not afford to pay everyone a Jewish wage and the 
Zionists refused anything less.  
 The number of Jews working on the harbor would increase dramatically during 
the later stages of construction once skilled and semiskilled positions were introduced. 
These positions would greatly increase the proportion of Jewish labor to a point that 
would be acceptable to the Zionists even if Jews no longer worked unskilled jobs. The 
government therefore just needed a solution for the first 18 months. The High 
Commissioner came up with the idea that Jews would be hired at a piece work rate. This 
would allow them to earn more but at the same time the common wage would still 
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 Rutenberg, with whom Chancellor consulted, agreed stating 
that in the long run, it would not even cost that much more as the intelligence and the 
energy of the Jews, coupled with an incentive to produce more, would cut down on 
construction time.
192
 The experimental wage was carried out in the Athlit quarry where 
stone was hewn for the harbor. By 1930, Jews made up 79 of the 559 employees working 
on Haifa harbor with about half of them in the quarries.  
 At first, it seemed that the experiment in Jewish piece work had paid off. In 1930, 
the head engineer reported that the Jews were producing much more per man than the 
Arabs and that the costs to the government were only slightly more, 101 mils per cubic 
meter for Jews and 96 mils for Arabs in March.
193
 The reports in April were even better 
as the costs were exactly the same for each group.
194
 The head engineer proposed 
introducing piece work to the Arabs in order to boost their production. The Colonial 
Office even recommended that all public works projects in Palestine start using this 
method.
195
 After carefully scrutinizing the numbers and the actual conditions of the 
quarry, it turned out that the piece work system was completely uneconomical. Jewish 
production was not even that much better than that of the Arabs. The original numbers 
did not take into account that the Jews were working an easier part of the quarry, had 
preferential access to transportation and were paying others to “level the quarry floor… 
to enable sidings to be laid up to the quarry face.”196 Cost per cubic meter for Jews in 
actuality was about 85 mils and 55 mils for Arabs. On average the Arabs made 156 mils a 
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day, a respectable amount, whereas Jews made an astonishing 520 mils! Not only was 
this uneconomical, but Jews were making nearly four times that of the Arabs. There were 
cries within the Colonial Office to end the experiment immediately, but it continued out 
of fear of a negative Zionist reaction.  
In the end, the government did discriminate against the Arabs. The decision 
drained the coffers of the country and the Arabs were well aware of it. As „Awni Bey 
„Abd al-Hadi pointed out, “owing to this differential wage paid by Government, on the 
Haifa Harbour Works…£160,000 was lost…”197  
 
Conclusion 
 There was a large discrepancy between the goals of the British and the outcome of 
their policies. The government thought that by encouraging Zionist growth in industry, 
the entire country‟s economy would improve and that the Zionists would focus on 
economics instead of politics. This had mixed results at best. Zionist industrial growth 
did benefit the Arabs to some extent through some factory jobs, but it also greatly 
strengthened Zionism economically and politically. Factories received dual protection 
through exemptions on imported raw materials and tariffs on foreign imports. These 
measures greatly helped the industries to survive, subsidize more expensive Jewish labor, 
and absorb more immigrants. On the other hand, Arab consumers paid higher prices for 
their daily necessities and the state lost revenue that could have been used to develop the 
Arab economy. The government‟s protection of Zionist industry also inadvertently hurt 
Arab agriculturalists and soap makers. To the Arabs, it seemed as if the British were 
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supporting uneconomical businesses at their expense and creating “an artificial door for 
immigration.”198  
 British and Zionist interests coincided nicely on the development of the country. 
Haifa harbor had an imperial purpose but also greatly supported Zionist growth. This 
level of cooperation extended to the exploitation of the country‟s natural resources.  The 
government had no intention of devoting its limited funds to large development projects 
such as the Huleh Valley or the Dead Sea. Instead, it looked to the Zionists to provide the 
necessary technical skills and funding. The British had hoped that benefits from the 
development of these resources would eventually reach the Arabs and demonstrate the 
positive effects of Zionism. Understandably, the Arabs rejected the premise that a foreign 
power could just hand over resources to a small sector of the population. While they 
received some jobs, the vast bulk of the benefits accrued to the Zionists who used the 
Rutenberg and Dead Sea schemes to boost production and allow further immigration. As 
an article in Filastin argued, the Arabs should reject the Rutenberg scheme, “…because 
we do not share with it in our money or its profits.”199 The case of the Dead Sea, the 
Huleh Valley, and the Rutenberg concession all proved to the Arabs that the British were 
intent on changing the economic and political balance of Palestine in favor of the 
Zionists.  
 The government treated the Arabs very paternalistically, asserting that they did 
not have the proper skill sets for development. However, Arab industry grew despite the 
policies of the government. The active desire of entrepreneurs like Ibrahim Hazboun 
proved that Arabs were interested in cooperating in building the country though the 
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British continued to relegate Arab economic activities to agriculture. The government 
wanted to preserve Palestinian society at a time when the economic conditions of the 
country were rapidly changing in order to keep the costs of governing the country down. 
A failing agricultural sector and a boom in construction jobs in the coastal cities helped 
lure Arabs from their villages, a process that challenged the power of the traditional 
village elites. The British feared the unsettling effect of having masses of Arab workers 
in the cities and greatly prohibited the development of Arab labor organizations. They 
also hoped that by protecting traditional patronage systems, Arab leaders would 
cooperate more. While the goal was to protect Arab society, the British were 
inadvertently helping to produce a class of frustrated workers who were increasingly 
alienated from their villages and saw the Zionist economy succeeding while they lived in 
poverty.
200
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AGRICULTURE: LIMITED SUPPORT  
AND UNFULFILLED PROMISES 
Agriculture was the one economic sphere in which the government intended to 
support the Arabs. While little was done during the 1920s partly due to fiscal constraints, 
the events of 1929 gave the British reason to reevaluate their economic policies and begin 
to focus on aiding Arab agriculture. Government reports called for credit institutions and 
greater protection of agricultural products. Sir John Chancellor wanted to limit Arab to 
Jewish land transfers and investigated opening up an agricultural bank and cooperatives. 
The British tried to keep wheat and barley prices high and High Commissioner Sir Arthur 
Wauchope (1932-1937) even looked into establishing an income tax to help the fellaheen. 
 In the end though, commitments to the international community and to the 
Zionists as well as budgetary constraints, combined with environmental disasters and a 
drop in agricultural prices, all greatly restricted the government‟s range of actions. The 
mandate and the Palestinian-Syrian trade agreement of 1921 prevented the British from 
fully protecting Palestine from foreign dumping. The commitment to the Jewish National 
Home precluded a severe crackdown on land sales, and budgetary constraints hindered 





protect the fellaheen through legislation and Palestinian agricultural production with 
quotas and tariffs on foreign goods, but the end results of these policies fell far short of 
their intentions and instead often backfired. 
 The rigidity of the commuted tithe during a collapse of market prices meant that 
the fellaheen often paid more in taxes than their crops were worth. Land legislation 
created further divisions in Palestinian society between the landlords and the fellaheen. 
The promises of credit facilities fell far short of expectations and even when the 
agricultural bank was created, it aided only the Zionists and wealthy Arab citrus growers. 
By the mid-1930s, British economic policies had left the Arabs greatly disappointed. At 
the same time that the Arabs were suffering, the Zionists continued to gain strength 
through land purchases and industrial production.  
 
Foreign Dumping 
 The British could not completely control the flow of imports into Palestine. 
Article 18 of the mandate stated that Palestine could not discriminate against members of 
the League of Nations. The government could raise tariffs on specific items, but the rates 
had to apply to all member states and could not target a specific country. The mandate in 
essence forced Palestine to treat all League members as „most favored nations.‟ This 
greatly hampered the government‟s ability to discriminate against imports and protect 
local goods. Article 18 also allowed Palestine to “conclude a special customs agreement 
with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or 
Arabia.”201 It was hoped that this would preserve the economic connectedness of former 
Ottoman territories, and Palestine had established such an agreement with Syria in 
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 In addition to the mandate, the British were also obliged to abide by the 1924 
Covenant between Great Britain and the United States. Though not a member of the 
League, America received the same benefits through the agreement. It also set a 
precedent for allowing other non-League members, such as Japan, free trade in 
Palestine.
203
 This treaty further hindered Britain‟s ability to control imports, as it stated 
that Palestine could not establish a trade policy that would discriminate against all non-
LON members.
204
 Even though it allowed for discrimination against individual non-
League members, the British were afraid of setting that precedent. 
 Of all the trade constraints placed on the British, the accord with Syria was 
particularly burdensome. It prevented the inclusion of Palestine from most favored nation 
trade agreements between Britain and other countries because then the other country 
could claim the duty free access Syria received.
205
 While it allowed for free trade 
between Palestine and Syria, the trade balance favored the latter disproportionately 
because it possessed a much larger economy than Palestine in the 1920s.
206
 Under the 
accord, products from third countries were exempt from tariffs as long as they partly 
consisted of Syrian or Palestinian labor or materials. This included basic retouching such 
as packaging. Many companies shipped their goods to Syria, retouched them, and then re-
exported them duty free to Palestine. Furthermore, many countries did not even alter the 
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goods, and just shipped them through Syria to Palestine duty free, because there was no 
proper mechanism to prevent fraud.  
A 1927 memorandum pinpointed several areas where the Syrian-Palestinian 
accord was being abused. It explained that Syrian bean producers were making more 
money by dumping their crop in Palestine and then importing beans from Italy for 
consumption.
207
 Sheep exported from Iraq and Arabia suddenly became Syrian before 
entering Palestine. The Syrian director of customs admitted that camels exported to 
Palestine were most likely from other countries as the records showed that there were 
more leaving Syria than the country even possessed. After 1925, the number of imports 
from Syria tripled, and the British estimated that nearly all confectionary, cotton, woolen, 
and leather goods were from third countries.
208
 The two groups hit the hardest though 
were the fellaheen who grew grain, and the Tel Aviv textile sector.
209
 In addition to 
hurting Zionist industry and Arab agriculture, the government was losing potential 
revenue as 60% of goods entering from Syria were admitted duty free.
210
 Therefore, 
every group in Palestine had reason to protest the accord.  
Given that so many sectors of the economy were affected, the British had asked 
the French to adjust the agreement in 1924. By 1927, the desire to reach a new accord 
picked up steam. One of the main amendments to the agreement would have prohibited 
goods that contained more than 75% foreign materials from receiving tariff 
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 While it would not have prohibited Syrian grain from flooding the 
Palestinian market, it ostensibly would have dealt with grain from other countries. By 
September, the text of the new agreement had been prepared by High Commissioner 
Herbert Plumer and was awaiting the signature of the High Commissioner in Syria, when 
all of the sudden an uproar came from the Tel Aviv textile manufacturers demanding that 
the old agreement stay intact. What had occurred between the early 1920s and 1927 to 
make the Zionist textile manufacturers change their mind on the accord with Syria?   
Zionist industrialists understood that with the generous duty exemptions on raw 
materials given to them by the government a few years earlier, in conjunction with cheap 
electricity from Rutenberg and the modernized Haifa harbor, they would soon be able to 
compete with the Syrians. As Norman Burns wrote in the 1930s, “the results are 
inevitable. The Syrian manufacturer is slowly choked by the unequal competition.”212 
Suddenly, Zionist industrialists planned not only to compete with Syrian manufactures, 
but hoped to conquer the much larger Syrian market. For example, even in the mid-
1920s, Shemen and other modernized Zionist soap producers began having a negative 
impact on the indigenous soap makers of Syria.
213
 Under pressure from the Tel Aviv 
textile manufacturers, who threatened to shut down their factories and further exacerbate 
Jewish unemployment,
214
 Lord Plumer withdrew the proposal. The agreement was 
updated in 1929 but essentially remained the same.
215
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With continued dumping by Syria and other countries in the late 1920s and early 
1930s, British attempts to protect Arab agriculture only affected the margins and offered 
only limited relief. The two hardest hit agricultural products were barley from Gaza and 
wheat. Given that the bulk of the fellaheen grew these two crops, it is safe to assume that 
a vast majority of Arab agriculturalists were affected by foreign dumping.
216
  
The British tried to protect the Palestinian barley market throughout the 1930s, 
but to no avail. In 1934, the government raised the duty on imported barley considerably 
in order to make Palestinian barley more competitive. The goal was to raise the market 
price. Before the duty, the government estimated that Turkey exported 22,000 tons of 
barley to Palestine whereas Syria exported 2,000.
217
 The duty successfully pushed out 
Turkish barley: Turkey exported a mere 6,000 tons in 1934. On the other hand, Syria 
became the largest source of barley imports to Palestine. By 1935, of the 12,503 tons of 
barley imported to Palestine, 12,488 came from Syria.
218
 This measure succeeded in 
raising the costs so that Turkish barley could not compete, but ultimately failed because it 
did not address Syrian barley. With no other competition except from Gaza, cheap Syrian 
barley further cornered the market and kept prices low. A British memorandum on the 
topic stated that by 1936, “…the benefits from this protection accrue mainly to Syrian 
producers…”219 
The British faced a similar problem with wheat. In 1930, the government 
established a licensing system to stabilize prices. When this proved ineffective, a seasonal 
                                                          
216
 Amos Nadan, The Palestinian Peasant Economy under the Mandate: A Story of Colonial Bungling 
(Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies: Cambridge, Mass, 2006), 83-86. 
217
 Colonial No. 133 Palestine Royal Commission: Memoranda Prepared by the Government of Palestine 









duty was introduced in which foreign wheat would pay a higher duty when Palestinian 
wheat was on the market in order to push foreign dumping to other seasons.
220
 The 
following year, a sliding scale of duties was enforced in order to keep the price at £9 a 
ton.
221
 Both systems failed because wheat from Turkey and Russia continued to enter 
Palestine through Syria duty free.
222
 The Standing Committee for Commerce and 
Industry often discussed the possibility of asking the French to exclude wheat from their 
trade agreement, but never pulled the trigger out of fear that this would set a precedent 
and that the French would then ask for Palestinian industrial products to be omitted.
223
 In 
1935, the French finally permitted Syrian wheat to be taxed at £3 per ton as long as 5,000 
tons annually were allowed duty free. While this helped the fellaheen a bit, the price of 
wheat remained well under £9 a ton throughout the end of the 1930s.
224
 
The issue of Palestinian agricultural products needs to be examined in a wider 
environmental and international context. Grain prices in Palestine were greatly affected 
by world grain prices, which, from 1920-27 were high, but subsequently dropped with the 
onset of the global depression. On top of that, Palestine faced multiple crop failures in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s. The worldwide drop in prices and environmental disasters 
combined with international constraints created a perfect storm for the fellaheen. There is 
no doubt that the government would have had a hard time protecting Palestinian wheat 
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and barley under „normal‟ conditions, but as „Issa Alami points out in his dissertation, if 
the British had been able to control imports to a greater extent, they would have been able 




Agricultural Bank and Cooperatives 
 Though they never became a very large source of land for the Jewish National 
Home, small landowners increasingly sold their land to the Zionists throughout the late 
1920s and 1930s. Providing the Arabs adequate access to credit through an agricultural 
bank and cooperatives was the only way to stop land transfers to Jews other than through 
an outright prohibition on the practice. With long-term credit, the Arabs could develop 
the land and make it more profitable to farm than to sell. The British had always 
understood that the lack of credit was a major problem, but because of a lack of financial 
resources and commitment, only made limited attempts throughout the 1920s to fix the 
situation. After the 1929 riots, the Hope Simpson and Shaw commission reports both 
recommended establishing credit facilities, but partly due to a lack of funds, cooperatives 
and an agricultural bank were only established in 1933 and 1935, respectively. While the 
cooperatives made limited progress in the short three years before the revolt, it was too 
late to ameliorate the situation of the fellaheen. The agricultural bank, an institution the 
peasants had been clamoring for, mostly benefited Jews as they had better access to land 
title given that they lived near the coast, the region of the country that the government 
first targeted for title distribution.  
The unwillingness of the British to create institutions that could provide the 
fellaheen with credit came from fiscal constraints and the lack of land titles. While the 







former will be discussed at length later, it is important to explain the land system of 
Palestine under the Ottomans first. Much of the land of Palestine was mush’a, 
communally owned and possessed by the entire village. The fellaheen would rotate 
annually which plot of land they worked. Given this arrangement, it would be impossible 
to have land titles and establish individual property rights. Another type of land was miri. 
With this land, the owner “did not hold the land by title deed but rather by usufruct, 
which gave him the legal right to the land and to the profit from it.”226 Under the 
Ottomans, governmental consent to sell or mortgage this land was required. The 
government tried to strengthen the position of owners in 1858 when it introduced laws 
requiring official registration of all land. Fearful that such registration would lead to 
conscription or higher taxes, many sought the protection of tribal leaders and effendis and 
had the land registered in the names of these elites. In essence, the small owners lost 
possession of the land and became tenants. Others who kept ownership of the land only 
had a small portion of it registered in order to avoid taxation.
227
  
When the British entered Palestine, the land title system was a mess. They began 
to carry out a proper land registry scheme by the 1920s, but never completed the project. 
While giving out loans without proper deeds as collateral would be extremely difficult, it 
was not impossible, as it was done from 1919-1923. Therefore, the British government‟s 
parsimony and lack of commitment must be seen as the largest hindrance towards 
creating credit institutions. 
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In 1929, the Congress of Arab Villagers demanded that the government cancel the 
debts of all the fellaheen and establish an agricultural bank.
228
 The First Arab Economic 
Congress also wanted the government to create an agricultural bank and claimed that 5% 
of the state‟s annual revenue should be dedicated to it.229 During the Peel Commission, 
„Awni Bey „Abd al-Hadi lauded the Ottoman Agricultural Bank while criticizing the 
British for not using tithe funds dedicated to it to aid the fellaheen.
230
  
  Established in 1898, the Ottoman Agricultural Bank had branches located 
throughout the country and provided loans at 6% interest. It was able to offer such a low 
rate because it received a subsidy of 0.5% of the tithe annually. Upon the British 
occupation of Palestine in 1917, the bank ceased to exist. Most of its assets were emptied 
during the war with only £20,000 remaining in Palestine. The military administration 
decided not to redevelop the bank and instead put the 0.5% of the tithe earmarked for the 
institution into the country‟s general funds. 231  
Understanding the importance of credit to agricultural development, Major 
General Money reached an agreement with the Anglo-Egyptian Bank to give out loans to 
the fellaheen. When the civilian administration arrived in 1920, Samuel continued this 
process. As Martin Bunton points out, this program was not the same as an agricultural 
bank nor was it a continuation of the Ottoman loan program. It was meant to be a stop 
gap measure until a proper credit institution could be founded. The Colonial Office tried 
to stop the High Commissioner from granting these loans given both the fiscal position of 
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the government and the political liabilities. London feared the ramifications from the 
government repossessing Arab land after a default. The High Commissioner felt a moral 
obligation to the Arabs and stated that under The Laws and Usages of War, the 




While the Colonial Office pushed for fiscal restraint, Samuel recognized the value 
of providing credit and its importance for developing agriculture. He stated that 
“representatives of all classes” clamored for the creation of a new agricultural bank,233 
and he even referred to the creation of one in the preamble of the Land Transfer 
Ordinance of 1920.
234
 The agreement between the Anglo-Egyptian Bank and the 
government ended in 1923. The bank would only continue lending money if the British 
government guaranteed the loan, but London refused to become involved financially in 
the scheme. 
Throughout his tenure, Samuel continually lobbied for the creation of an 
agricultural bank. He formed a committee to examine the issue and the majority opinion 
argued that the government needed to open a new agricultural bank as private banks were 
unlikely to extend credit to the fellaheen because a great majority of them lacked proper 
title to their land. The government was well aware that without strong leadership from the 
state, the private sector was unlikely to open an agricultural bank on its own. The High 
Commissioner hoped that the end of the Anglo-Egyptian lending system would motivate 
London to establish a new bank. Again, the Colonial Office refused to even think about 
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spending money on the project. Sir Herbert Samuel made one last desperate effort to get 
the funding by trying to get it included in a draft of the Palestine Loan in 1924, but the 
Colonial Office again thwarted his plan by citing fiscal difficulties.
235
 
 Until 1929, the government made no attempt to find a long-term solution for the 
credit crisis. A few private banks in Palestine did provide credit, but only to wealthy 
landlords.
236
 The main source of credit for the fellaheen came from the government 
which issued small short-term loans during emergencies, most notably the Beersheba 
Cultivators Loans of 1927 and the Seed Loans of 1928.
237
 These loans were never more 
than £15 and were only issued in order to save the fellaheen from an unmitigated disaster 
such as a crop failure. These miniscule loans were only a drop in the ocean. Developing 
the agricultural sector and therefore stabilizing it lied in granting larger and longer term 
credit. As Sir John Chancellor wrote, “…the introduction of capital is indispensable if 
agriculture is to be developed and that credit facilities must be given to individual 
agriculturalists throughout the country in order to enable them to improve their 
methods.”238  
 It was only after the 1929 riots that the government seriously began looking into 
establishing institutions to provide credit. High Commissioner Chancellor established 
another committee to look into the issue and it recommended raising a loan of £1/2 
million in order to finance a new bank. Lord Passfield would not even entertain the idea. 
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The British had a hard enough time raising a loan for the Jerusalem drainage scheme, and 
were not prepared to go through the process again.
239
 Furthermore, he claimed it was 
premature to establish an agricultural bank in Palestine, as most Arabs lacked proper title 
to their land and without it, they would have no collateral for a loan. The process of 
surveying the land and providing titles had languished throughout the mid-1920s and did 
not begin to make progress until 1928. It was estimated that a fully staffed survey team 
would complete the task by the early 1940s at the earliest.
240
 Therefore, there would not 
be enough suitable customers to sustain such a bank. While the Colonial Office ignored 
the demands for an agricultural bank, it was greatly attracted to the idea of setting up 
Arab cooperatives. 
 The British were drawn to the idea of Arab cooperatives because German and 
Jewish settlements already had several hundred of their own that were thriving.
241
 What 
made it even more attractive to London was that it would be far cheaper than an 
agricultural bank. The 1929 Credit Commission had recommended taking the £20,000 
that had remained in the account of the Ottoman Agricultural Bank to start a new bank. 
Lord Passfield instead wanted this money to fund cooperatives. In 1931, the British sent 
C. F. Strickland, a cooperatives expert, to investigate the possibility of establishing them 
in Palestine. 
 Strickland had nothing but disdain for the idea of an agricultural bank as he 
thought that the Arabs would just squander the credit that it would provide. Instead, he 
believed that they needed to be taught through cooperatives on how best to utilize credit. 
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While the Colonial Office thought that the cooperative scheme would be a cheap way of 
providing credit to the Arabs, Strickland had expensive plans. He wanted a large loan to 
set up an educational system and an expensive broadcasting station to guide the Arabs.
242
 
The British were only willing to spend the £20,000 they had on hand and though they 
originally thought about asking Strickland to take the position of Registrar of 
Cooperatives, they changed their mind after hearing his pricey ideas. 
 The process of finding a registrar itself was fraught with delays over funding for 
his salary. The O‟Donnell Commission was scheduled to arrive in Palestine in mid-1931 
in order to trim the budget, and the government wanted to wait for its findings before 
employing a registrar. Chancellor was thoroughly frustrated as the “Arabs are in a very 
sullen and suspicious state…” and he hoped that an immediate appointment of the 
registrar would assuage them.
243
 After a short delay and hounding from Jerusalem, the 
Treasury finally gave in. Once the Colonial Office agreed to hire a registrar, it then 
refused to spend the money to employ an experienced official.  
At first, Chancellor wanted to appoint an officer who understood cooperatives, 
was fluent in Arabic, and could quickly pick up Hebrew. After realizing that no such man 
existed, the High Commissioner dropped the language requirement and sought to employ 
A. Cavendish, who was previously Director of Cooperation of the Malay States and had 
come highly recommended by Strickland. The Colonial Office refused to pay for an 
experienced officer when a local one could be hired for much less. With no other choice, 
Chancellor finally decided to hire a man whom Strickland called, “the least unsuitable” of 
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the local officers, “but was of no great ability.”244 Strickland understood how important 
the position of Registrar of Cooperatives was for the success of the program, and on 
hearing that the government had refused to hire Cavendish because it would have cost 
more money, he ominously predicted that,  
Sooner or later, the impoverished economy of the Arabs would provide the 
necessary fuel for a conflagration fomented by political agitators… The Treasury 
would have to spend a good deal more money in putting down widespread 
disorder than would be necessary to make a beginning with proper cooperative 




The government finally began establishing cooperatives in 1933. Historians 
remain uncertain whether these cooperatives led to any actual improvement for the 
fellaheen before the revolt though. Amos Nadan states that they developed rapidly and 
“seemed promising” with 121 cooperatives by 1937-1938.246 Martin Bunton on the other 
hand questions such rosy reports and cites an analysis that claimed that even by 1938, the 
credit societies were still very small.
247
  
The lack of success of the agricultural bank on the other hand is unquestionable. 
After over a decade of refusing to endorse any loan that would fund the program, the 
government spent several more years negotiating with private banks to establish the 
agricultural bank. Eventually, such an institution was finally created in 1935 by several 
private banks after the government contributed £150,000, which had been earmarked for 
a police training school.
248
 The scheme failed to provide any succor to the fellaheen as 
the bank refused to give them loans because they did not have official land titles. While it 
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is understandable that the lack of an official deed would prohibit lending, it must be 
pointed out that the loan scheme of 1919-1923 worked without such a strict requirement. 
Instead of an official deed, the government accepted the statement of the village mukhtar 
and two local notables that the individual in question did own the land. While the 
Colonial Office criticized this method, the 1929 commission found that the increase in 
tithe from development more than made up for the losses from bad loans.
249
  
In fact, given that the process of establishing deeds was focused mostly in the 
plains near the coast, the only ones who had access to the bank were Jews and wealthy 
Arab citrus growers. The scheme helped Zionist development without that being the 
explicit goal.
250
 When the government became aware that the bank would greatly help the 
Zionists, it provided £50,000 in medium to long-term loans to fellaheen in the hill 
regions. This system was established in 1935, and the applications exceeded the amount 
of credit allocated. No loans were actually made because of the insecurity of the country 
following the general strike late in 1935 and the subsequent revolt.
251
   
In conclusion, the creation of the agricultural bank and the cooperatives came 
more than a decade too late. As we have seen, the British understood the credit problem 
but largely ignored it until 1929, and even then were only willing to spend minimal 
amounts on solutions. Instead of investing money in rural development to stabilize the 
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Of all the complaints from the Arabs regarding British economic policies, none 
was more ubiquitous than that of the burdensome nature of the tithe and taxation. Under 
Ottoman Law, the tithe was supposed to be 10% of gross product, but the government 




 century. For 
example, starting in 1897, an additional 0.5% was included for the Ottoman Agricultural 
Bank and a further 0.5% was added during World War I for the war effort. By the time 
General Allenby entered Palestine, the official tithe rate was 12.5%.
253
 Since the tithe was 
a tax on the gross product and not net profit, it was actually a tax on the costs of 
production as well. The fellaheen also paid the werko, an immovable property tax, and 
the aghnam, an animal tax. In addition to direct taxes, they also paid duties on imported 
goods. 
Tax farming reigned in Palestine until the end of the Ottoman Empire. The Porte 
had tried to enact tax reforms throughout the 19
th
 century, but few were actually enforced 
and even fewer remained in effect over a long period of time. In 1839, the sultan had 
abolished tax farming because of its predatory nature. By 1842, tithe returns had dropped 
to such extent that it was reintroduced. In 1889, a law was passed to limit the abuses of 
tax farming. It would have allowed for arbitration if a dispute arose between a tax farmer 
and a cultivator, but it was never enforced.
254
 Instead, the tax collectors continued to 
collect sums more or less arbitrarily. They would take less from the notables and the 
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elites who could pay a bribe, but continued to abuse the fellaheen by collecting far more 
than the legal amount.  
From 1918-1925, the British took several steps to reform the tithe. The two that 
greatly helped the fellaheen were the elimination of tax farming immediately following 
the British occupation, and then the readjustment of the tithe to 10% in 1925. With that 
said, most of these measures were meant to streamline the process and make the tithe 
easier to administer.
255
 The government continued several Ottoman practices that greatly 
hurt the peasants. For example, the British continued to force the fellaheen to keep their 
crops on the threshing floor until an assessor arrived, which could take up to 25 days. 
This left the crop vulnerable to the elements and to thieves. While waiting, the fellaheen 
lost the opportunity to sell his product when prices were high.
256
 To add insult to injury, 
the peasant was also obliged to house and entertain the assessor at his expense. 
In order to make the tithe easier to administer, the government began to collect it 
in cash instead of in kind. The former method was far too burdensome for the 
government as it would have to store and then market the crop. The decision to collect 
the tax in cash made the process of estimating the tithe harder since a monetary value for 
the crop needed to be determined. To do this, the country was divided into small sections 
and in each one, a British team would ascertain the physical amount of the crop. Then, 
each district commissioner, in his own area, would establish the redemption price, the 
amount in cash a cultivator would pay on his crop per ton based on the market price.
257
 
This estimation process was difficult to carry out as it needed very rigorous knowledge of 
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local conditions and prices, and was never completely accurate.
258
 Given the fluctuations 
in market prices and quantities grown, the redemption price changed every year, making 
it hard for the fellaheen to prepare for the following season. This process continued until 
the commuted tithe. 
Because of the inexact nature of estimating the redemption price, Issa Alami 
concludes that the fellaheen paid an average of 10.9% of their gross product for the tithe 
from 1922-1927.
259
 On top of that, they paid 6.2% for the werko for a total of 17.1% of 
gross product.
260
 After factoring in the costs of production, depending on the crop, the 
direct rural taxation consisted anywhere between 25-57% of net profits.
261
 The numbers 
used to obtain these percentages were taken from E. R. Sawer‟s A Review of the 
Agricultural Situation in 1923. In must be noted that Sawer calculated the net profits of 
crops on maximum yields which were unrealistic for the environmental conditions of 
Palestine.
262
 For example, he admitted that while the tithe was 34.8% of net profit for 
millet with maximum yields, in reality, with actual yields, it was 45.5%.
263
 Alami uses 
more realistic yields and prices to determine that most farmers actually took a loss on 
their crops during 1922-1927.
264
  
The government had wanted to implement a land tax as it was considered the 
most equitable form of direct taxation other than the income tax, but this was impossible 
during the 1920s because the cadastral survey of Palestine was still on going. Instead, the 
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government enacted the Commuted Tithe in 1927 in order to alleviate the position of the 
fellaheen as a stop gap measure until the land tax could be enacted. In theory, the 
commuted tithe was a better form of taxation because it eliminated the annual process of 
estimating the redemption price.  
For the redemption price of crops during the commuted tithe, the government just 
averaged the redemption prices of the previous four years. These years were chosen 
because they included one bad, one good, and two average ones. The span also needed to 
be an even number to accommodate the olive growers given that the reaping methods of 
beating the branches often produced a poor crop every other year.
265
 This new system 
successfully eliminated the ambiguity surrounding prices and allowed the fellaheen to 
better prepare from year to year. 
 The peasants initially praised the commuted tithe.
266
 Unfortunately, the new tithe 
lacked any flexibility. This greatly hurt the fellaheen as the late 1920s and early 1930s 
witnessed numerous major environmental disasters, including four years of locust 
plagues and five years of field mice infestations.
267
 On top of this, Palestine faced severe 
droughts which led to crop failures such as the one in 1931 that wiped out the entire 
winter crop in Beersheba and Gaza.
268
 To make matters worse, worldwide prices of 
agricultural products dropped dramatically after 1928. The farmer therefore paid taxes on 
his goods at the higher previous rate, but then sold them at the far lower current market 
value. For example, during this period, the average tax on barley and olive oil was 11.5 
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mils per kilo and 54.6 mils per kilo, respectively, but the average market price was 5.8 
mils per kilo and 30.3 mils per kilo, respectively.
269
 
Many authors claim that because the tithe was reduced to 7.5% in 1932 and large 
amounts of the tithe were remitted during this period, the level of taxation decreased. 
„Issa Alami on the other hand concludes that even after the lower tax rate and remissions, 
because of an increase in the rate of the werko and the collapse of market prices, the 
fellaheen were taxed 19.2% of gross product, a higher rate than before.
270
 This led to 
them taking out large loans from money lenders, often the same merchants to whom the 
fellaheen sold their goods, just to survive.
271
 The Hope Simpson report confirmed that the 
commuted tithe had led to more poverty among the fellaheen.
272
 
In 1935, the government finally ameliorated taxation with the implementation of 
the land tax and eliminated the werko. The land tax was based on the quality of soil, with 
the most productive land being taxed the highest rates. The tax was also on net profit 
instead of gross production and the average effective rate of taxation in 1935 was 9.73% 
of net income.
273
 While this tax was undoubtedly much better than the previous two, 
decades of onerous taxation under the Ottomans and the British, combined with the 
complete devastation of the agricultural sector during the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
meant that many fellaheen continued to live in abject poverty.  
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Income Tax Commission 
I weep for you the walrus said, I deeply sympathize, Oh land of long 
catastrophe of every shape and size… 
Assyrians had a hack at you and Babylonians too, Came Alexander 
moping round and then the Roman crew 
The Arabs and the Saracens then took a running punch, And I don‟t 
suppose Crusaders were a wholly gentle bunch… 
But of all the stern inflictions that have bowed your people‟s backs, 
The worst is now approaching in our British Income Tax…274 
 
Ever since the early 1920s, the British had understood that the fellaheen were 
seriously burdened by the amount of tax they had to pay. Sir Herbert Samuel 
acknowledged that the fellaheen could not handle the encumbrance and investigated the 
possibility of enacting an income tax in addition to a professional and trader‟s tax in 
1923. This was part of an effort to distribute more direct taxation to the urban 
population.
275
 Eventually though, the government deemed it premature to implement 
either. The idea of an income tax appeared again following the 1929 riots, when the 
Johnson-Crosbie report of 1930 saw the income tax as a way of distributing the burden of 
taxation away from the fellaheen.
276
   
 It is not clear if the report had any impact, but in 1932, High Commissioner Sir 
Arthur Wauchope ordered an income tax expert to evaluate the possibility of 
implementing it in Palestine. He cited two reasons. First, he sought to alleviate the tax 
burden of the fellaheen given that the past three years had been particularly devastating 
for them. Second, he wanted to establish a secure source of revenue. The global 
economic depression of the 1930s did not affect the government of Palestine because of 
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infusions of Zionist money, but the possibility of a future economic crisis scared him. 
During the 1930s, the bulk of the revenue increasingly came through custom duties. In 
general, this kind of tax is not very stable and is regarded as inferior to an income tax.
277
   
The taxes on expenditure were inefficient as far as the state was concerned since 
the amount of an individual‟s contribution depended on the amount he was 
willing to spend, whereas income tax had to be paid on earnings which the earner 
would hardly wish to restrict.
278
   
 
Wauchope wanted to be proactive. With an income tax commission, he could establish 
the tax during prosperity and secure revenue, or if it were found not feasible to carry out 
at the present time, he would have the mechanism established in order to implement it 
during a time of necessity. In February of 1934, J. F. Huntington of the Board of Inland 
Revenue of the United Kingdom arrived in Palestine. 
Even before the commission had arrived, the Jewish community was up in arms. 
They had several arguments. First, they claimed that the fellaheen were not overburdened 
by taxation as the government often forgave a large percentage of the tithe throughout the 
1930s. Second, the budget continued to produce a surplus over the last few years so it 
was unnecessary to implement any new taxes at all. Third, the bulk of the revenue came 
from expenditure taxes and tariffs of which the Jews paid a larger proportion than the 
Arabs, and that an income tax would also disproportionately target Jews.
279
 Fourth, an 
income tax would force capitalists to divert capital and factories from Palestine to Syria 
and that it would prevent further Jewish immigration.
 280
  
 For their part, the fellaheen fully supported the income tax. Because they made so 
little, the chances were that they would be exempt from it. Furthermore, as Huntington 
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discovered, the mere opposition of the Jews was reason enough for them to support it. 
The fellaheen became further enamored with the concept once they realized that the 
Zionists feared that the income tax would negatively affect immigration.
281
 Many wealthy 
Arabs on the other hand privately lamented the tax since they would be charged as 
heavily as the Jews, but in public, they backed it and used it to further agitate the 
fellaheen. By the time the income tax commission arrived in 1934, the country was 
divided on the issue along religious lines.
282
 
 After speaking to representatives from all of the communities, the commission 
decided that it would be impossible to implement an income tax in Palestine because it 
would be too difficult to enforce. Both sides saw the government as a foreign entity and 
few people, neither Jews nor Arabs, would honestly report their income.
283
 Huntington 
wrote, “I was frankly reminded by one Jew of high standing that… the people of 
Palestine regarded the government as a foreign one and felt no sort of moral obligations 
towards it in any case in which its requirements conflicted with their inclinations…”284 
Furthermore, very few people in Palestine practiced proper bookkeeping. It goes without 
saying that the fellaheen did not keep books, but the commission found, to their surprise, 
that a majority of Jews did not either.
285
 The cost of administering the tax would be 
prohibitive and its actual enforcement would cause further tension between the 
inhabitants and the government. Some within the Colonial Office disagreed, claiming that 
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after the initial anger and difficulties, both sides would soon accept the tax.
286
 The High 
Commissioner though accepted the reasoning of the commission and declared that 
Palestine was not ready for the income tax. 
 The intention of the government in looking into the issue was to alleviate the 
condition of the fellaheen from onerous taxation. Clearly though, the implementation of 
an income tax was premature. On top of the reasons already listed, the British had already 
established income tax in Jordan and Iraq and in both cases, the results were less than 
satisfactory. It failed to bring in the revenue needed to replace direct taxation on 
agriculturists and in both countries, the burden fell mostly on British officials and 
companies.
287
 The British decision not to implement the tax in 1934 was clearly a rational 
one. 
 During the Peel Commission hearings, the Arabs complained that though the land 
tax had helped the fellaheen, they were still suffering and the only way to fix the situation 
was to implement the income tax. Fuad Effendi Saba claimed that Huntington had in fact 
favored establishing an income tax and “somehow or other this enquiry was shelved.”288 
Jamal Bey al-Husayni blamed Zionist pressure in London, and said that, “the Zionist 
Executive, the Mandatory over the Mandatory, stopped it.”289 There is absolutely no 
evidence of this. The income tax inquiry took place in a very charged atmosphere. The 
Arabs had grown accustomed to the government making economic decisions that helped 
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the Zionists. Again, as already stated, many wealthy Arabs privately were against the tax, 
so the statements made by the elites during the hearings were probably not very genuine, 
but the sentiment conveyed, that the Arabs were suffering while the Jews continued to 




We swear by God and by our country that we will not sell our land to 
Jews, either directly or indirectly, that we boycott Jewish goods and 
products, that we encourage Arab commerce and industry, and that 
we boycott every Arab who buys from Jews anything but land.290 
 
 Throughout the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, Zionists bought land in Palestine, 
mostly from Syrian absentee landlords. The prices, combined with a lack of emotional 
attachment and legal ambiguity resulting from the mandate system that separated them 
from their land, motivated them to sell. By the late 1920s, the Zionists had purchased 
most of the land that the absentee landlords owned and then began focusing on buying 
from large Palestinian landlords.
291
  
 As already mentioned, the Palestinian agricultural economy faced a severe crisis 
starting in the late 1920s. With land values increasing and the agricultural sector in 
disarray, it was more profitable for the Palestinian landlords to sell the land than to rent it 
out. Also, the fellaheen had become overwhelmed with loans that they had been obliged 
to take out as a result of multiple crop failures that occurred in the early 1930s, and 
resorted to selling their land to pay off the moneylenders. In the early 1920s, transfers 
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Buying land from the fellaheen was a far more complicated process than 
purchasing from absentee landlords. With large landowners, the Zionists could purchase 
a large contiguous plot and only negotiate with one person who usually had the land 
cleared of tenants prior to the transfer. The plots of the fellaheen were much smaller and 
deals often needed to be made with several of them to create a plot of land viable for 
Zionist settlement. Dealing directly with the fellaheen created a more acute sense of 
alienation than had occurred when negotiating with large landowners. The fellaheen 
realized that their “economic, political, and even physical future was at stake.”293 
By the 1920s, land sales had taken on an overtly political tone. Stopping these 
land transfers had become one of the main rallying cries of the Palestinian nationalist 
movement. During the Peel Commission hearings, several prominent Arab politicians 
criticized the government for not doing more to prevent Jewish acquisition of Arab land.  
At the same time, many of these notables had themselves sold land or helped to facilitate 
the transfer of land to Jews. For example, „Awni Bey „Abd al-Hadi, founder of the Istiqlal 
party and a member of the Arab Higher Committee, had served as a legal advocate to the 




Controlling the land issue was extremely difficult for the British as the needs of 
the fellaheen and the future Jewish National Home were diametrically opposed. 
Furthermore, commitments to both groups were enshrined in the same article of the 
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mandate. Article Six spoke of the requirement of the government to support the “close 
settlement by Jews on the land…” at the same time “ensuring that the rights and position 
of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.” Therefore, any policy adopted that 
would restrict Jewish settlement would lead to protests by the Zionist Organization, and 
any lease of state land or any law that helped to facilitate Jewish land purchase could 
leave the government open to criticism from the Arabs.  
At the same time, the British needed to take into consideration how land sales fit 
into the wider economic and political situation of Palestine. With Jews increasingly 
contributing a larger proportion of the country‟s revenue, the government needed to 
secure the development of Zionism. Growth of Zionist land holdings not only allowed for 
the absorption of more immigrants, but the land issue was a very powerful symbol that 
could be used by the Zionists in order to attract donations from international Jewry. 
Taking drastic steps to prohibit land transfers would devastate Zionist development and 
therefore affect the government revenue. Likewise, the large Arab landowners wanted to 
sell their land for a profit and the government needed to placate them in order to convince 
them to collaborate politically. If the government cracked down too much on land sales, it 
feared that the notables would no longer cooperate. Therefore, in addition to allowing 
land transfers, the government often made sure to keep such deals between wealthy Arabs 
and Zionists under wraps. 
Instead of securing the position of the fellaheen through investments, the British 
focused on legislation. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the British continuously enacted 
and adjusted legislation in order to try and meet the objectives of the Arab landlords, the 





fellaheen as it could be and was easily circumvented. High Commissioner Chancellor 
eventually argued that the only way to prevent the dispossession of the fellaheen was to 
prohibit the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews, but given the commitment to the budget, 
the Zionists, and the Arab landlords, this would not be forthcoming. Though better for the 
fellaheen, legislation in the 1930s did not adequately ameliorate the situation.  
 
Land Legislation 
 Throughout the late 1920s and 1930s, Arabs continuously petitioned the 
government to protect the rights of the fellaheen. In 1929, the Congress of Arab Villagers 
asked for further legislative protection that would force selling fellaheen to maintain a 
certain viable lot for their future income.
295
 During the Peel Commission, „Awni Bey 
„Abd al-Hadi stated that the ordinances that the British had implemented were not 
effective because the government did not enforce them.
296
 Jamal Bey al-Husayni, 
member of the Palestine Arab Party and the Arab Higher Committee, went further and 
put the government‟s inability to provide legal protection for the fellaheen into the wider 
context of the failing agricultural situation due to British policies towards agricultural 
credit, and its failure to protect Palestinian wheat.
297
  
 Upon entering the country, the military administration had found the land registry 
system a mess as most of the documents had been taken by the fleeing Ottoman army. 
The administration decided to prohibit land transfers to prevent speculation in land and to 
protect the fellaheen who would have otherwise sold their land as they faced defaulting 
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 During the war, a sizeable proportion of the fellaheen had taken out 
additional loans in order to pay a fee and avoid conscription.
299
 In 1920, Sir Herbert 
Samuel re-opened the land registry as he hoped that this measure would lead to 
investments in land and boost the economy.
300
  
 That same year, the High Commissioner passed the Land Transfer Ordinance of 
September 1920. It stated that the local district commissioner had to give his consent to 
all land purchases and in order to receive such approval, all tenants had to be provided 
with a plot of land which would be sufficient to sustain them and their families. It also 
restricted land sales larger than 300 dunams and those worth more than £3,000. Pressure 
from London, the Zionists, and Arab landlords to ease restrictions on transfers forced the 
government to remove some of the most important ones. 
While the 1920 Land Transfer Ordinance provided protection to tenants, it left 
laborers and subtenants completely vulnerable. Kenneth Stein states that these 
unprotected classes made up around 80% of the Arab rural population.
301
 When the 
Jewish National Fund bought land in Shatta village, only five of the 60 families that lived 
on the land were eligible for compensation as the other 55 families were laborers or sub-
tenants.
302
 Even with this glaring defect, the 1920 ordinance remained the most effective 
piece of legislation for protecting the fellaheen during that decade. 
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 The 1921 Land Transfer Ordinance removed restrictions on transfers based on 
size and value. Though it still required the seller to provide maintenance areas for tenants, 
this was easily evaded by evicting them before the deal was reported to the government. 
There were other ways to manipulate the maintenance area clause as well. In the case of 
the sale of the Jezreel Valley, the Jewish National Fund offered the fellaheen leases to 
land at prices that the Zionists knew they could not afford.
303
 When the fellaheen were 
unable to lease the land, the JNF then gave them monetary compensation instead. The 
government approved of the transfer even though the letter of the law had not been 
followed. In other cases, purchasers allowed the fellaheen to stay on the land for a few 
years, and then later gave them monetary compensation for leaving.  
 In 1929, the government passed the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance which 
replaced the 1921 Land Transfer Ordinance. This new law eliminated the maintenance 
area clause and legalized monetary compensation. Kenneth Stein stresses how Zionist 
influence was critical in getting this change. By legalizing monetary compensation, the 
Protection of Cultivators Ordinance of 1929 effectively rolled back all the protections 
that the peasants had received from the 1920 Land Transfer Ordinance. In essence, 
instead of enforcing the ordinances, which would have been unpopular with both the 
Zionists and the Arab sellers, the government adjusted the law to accommodate actual 
practice on the ground. 
 The aftermath of the 1929 riots forced the government to reassess its policy on 
land sales. High Commissioner Chancellor wanted to pass land restrictions that would 
greatly prevent Zionist development. With Lord Passfield in the Colonial Office instead 
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of Amery and William Ormsby-Gore, Chancellor thought he had a chance of pushing 
through new legislation.
304
 It was already clear to the government that the previous 
legislation had failed. Evicted fellaheen could not easily find land, and when they could, 
the compensation they received was never enough to buy it. Therefore, they were forced 
to again become tenants, leaving them vulnerable.
305
 Sir John Chancellor stated,  
It is clear that a situation has now arisen in which the interests of the indigenous 
population and the interests of the Jews as regards agricultural land are in direct 
conflict; for further purchases of agricultural land by the Jews can be made only 
by dispossessing Arab cultivators of the land they are occupying and so creating a 




He then concluded that new legislation needed to be passed that would go far 
beyond the restrictions of even the 1920 ordinance. The proposed law would allow land 
transfers from Arabs to Jews only with the approval of the High Commissioner himself, 
and given that Chancellor was very much against Zionism, this would never happen. This 
would give the fellaheen “a measure of protection similar to that… enjoyed by the Jews 
in respect to land owned by the Jewish National Fund.”307 Chancellor not only 
understood how drastic this measure was, but that it would also go against the mandate, 
and wanted it to be altered to accommodate the new legislation.
308
  
 Given that Zionist funds made up the bulk of the revenue, and that Arab landlords 
wanted to sell their land, London refused to take Chancellor‟s drastic recommendations 
seriously. Though the Passfield White Paper of October 1930 was intended to limit land 
transfers to some extent, Zionist pressure led to the MacDonald Letter four months later 
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which annulled it. With far reaching legislation out of the question, the government 
continued to pass ordinances which played around the edges of the issue in the hopes of 
ameliorating the situation of the fellaheen.  
 In 1931, Chancellor enacted the Protection of Cultivators Amendment Ordinance 
in order to strengthen traditional grazing rights. The ordinance was amended in 1933 to 
strengthen statutory tenancy rights of the fellaheen. It prohibited a landlord from evicting 
a tenant who had occupied a plot of land for over a year. This led to some unintended 
consequences. Landlords began shifting the fellaheen from one plot to another before 
they could gain tenancy rights. Squatters and illegitimate tenants began making claims to 
the government against landowners. All this created a great deal of tension in Palestinian 
society. The Zionists on the other hand avoided tenancy issues by just increasing the 
amount of compensation they paid to the fellaheen.
309
 Amazingly, the new ordinance 
actually increased land transfers of large plots. Arab landlords started to fear the 
possibility of claims coming from any of their tenants or illegitimate sources and 
therefore those with, “large estates of 1,000 dunams or more sold their lands to Jewish 
purchasers rather than run the risk of tenancy claims.”310  
While the 1933 amendment made transfers more complicated, it did not do 
enough to stem the tide. Instead, it created even more division among Palestinians. 
Instead of investing in development, the government continuously tried to find a cheaper 
solution, but with multiple commitments that precluded meaningful action, Zionists 
continued to purchase Arab land. It was not until the MacDonald White Paper of 1939 
that the government took serious measures to prohibit land transfers. 
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 During the 1920s, the government exerted little effort to aid the plight of the 
fellaheen since other apparently more pressing commitments precluded any major efforts. 
Supposed fiscal difficulties prevented investment in agricultural development as the 
Colonial Office refused to deviate from its policy of fiscal conservatism even though 
Palestine produced a surplus. After the 1929 riots, the British could no longer ignore the 
economic predicament of the Arabs.  
 In the 1930s, the government then made several attempts to assist the Arab 
economy. It passed more legislation to protect Arab tenants, seriously investigated setting 
up credit facilities, and tried to protect agricultural products from foreign dumping. While 
several measures benefitted the fellaheen slightly, the overall economic policy towards 
the Arabs failed to achieve its goals, partly for the same reasons which prohibited the 
development of the Arab economy during the 1920s, mainly commitments to the 
international community, the budget, the Zionists, and Arab notables. All these 
constraints left few options open for the government.  
 All this occurred at a time in which the agricultural sector faced a major crisis. 
Due to environmental and international conditions beyond the control of the government, 
drought, locust, and mice infestations occurred at the same time as a worldwide 
depression, which caused agricultural prices to drop precipitously. The value of the 
mainstay of fellaheen agriculture, grain, plummeted steeply. The fellaheen fell into 
further debt and were forced to sell their land to pay off moneylenders. Their poverty was 
juxtaposed with the growing strength of Zionism, since the government continued to 





quickly growing and the Zionists continued to gobble up more Arab land while they 
planned to conquer the Syrian market with their industrial production. In this atmosphere, 
the rational decision of the British not to adopt the income tax took on a charged political 
meaning as the Arabs concluded that the government was once again siding with the 
Zionists over them.     
Complicated by other commitments and constraints, British agricultural policies 
fell far short of their intentions. Just as their policies towards industry and development 
had unintentionally led to negative implications for the Arabs, their agricultural policies 
often inadvertently exacerbated the situation. As Kenneth Stein states in regards to 
combating Arab indebtedness, the “British had good intentions but lacked real 
commitment.”311 Even policies that did benefit the fellaheen somewhat, such as the land 
tax and cooperatives, occurred far too late to have a positive impact.  
During the early and mid-1930s, report after report explained that the poor 
economic conditions of the fellaheen had made them morose and increasingly upset at the 
government. The commissioner of lands, Albert Abramson, wrote an extremely 
illuminating memorandum on how the fellaheen had lost hope that their position would 
improve. 
Agricultural officers say that when they go to villages to discuss or explain 
improved methods of cultivation, they are met with silence or caustic remarks on 
the futility of government officers tendering advice to people whose financial 
situation, the government must be aware, is such that they have no means of 
raising money for their ordinary requirements, or for the payment of taxes, and 
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 Abramson emphasized that the fellaheen had become sullen and apathetic but that left 





















































CONCLUSION: THE GREAT WHITE UMPIRE  
 A. G. Hopkins coined the phrase, “the Great White Umpire” to refer to colonial 
governments‟ economic policies of making sure existing economic rules were followed, 
not changed.
313
 Hopkins postulates that the governments used this concept of non-
interference to allow private enterprise and market forces to dictate the specialization of 
the colony‟s production. This theory is completely absurd, as in the case of Palestine we 
have seen that the government often went against market forces and changed economic 
policies by giving unprofitable Zionist industries protective tariffs and by hiring 
uneconomical Jewish labor. The phrase „the Great White Umpire‟ is often how the 
British tried to portray themselves. With two nationalist groups and disparate economic 
and political goals, the government often saw itself as an uninterested mediator. In 
actuality though, the government often treated both groups very differently and sacrificed 
Arab needs for those of the Zionists. 
During the first decade of the mandate, the government focused on development 
of the country. The British granted generous concessions to the Zionists as they shared 
similar development goals. Sir Herbert Samuel devoted resources to public works and 
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infrastructure and although the increased lines of communications, new roads, and a 
retooled railroad system helped the Arabs to some extent, they provided a crucial boost to 
Zionist economic development and settlement.  
 As the Zionists generally did not need funds from the government for 
development, the British allowed them to govern themselves and invest in any way they 
saw fit. For example, Tel Aviv was nearly completely run by the Zionists from 1921-27 
and the city provided most of its own services and security. The government gave this 
municipality an unprecedented amount of independence. Although this autonomy ended 
in 1928 when the British realized that the fiscal burden was too much for the city to 
handle, it demonstrates the way that the British viewed the Zionists. As long as the Jews 
were able to financially support themselves, the British would not interfere. In fact, as 
long as they were willing to contribute economically to the country, the government was 
willing to accommodate them with industrial protection and other changes in policies in 
order to facilitate further success. 
 The government‟s treatment of the Arabs was vastly different. Lacking the 
financial resources of the Zionists, the Arab sector relied primarily on the British. 
Unfortunately, neither London nor Jerusalem was prepared to abandon imperial financial 
policies of parsimony and invest heavily. The Zionists had a working health care and 
educational system while the government failed to provide the same for the Arabs. 
Instead, the government spent most of the country‟s revenue on security and defense, 
which naturally helped to further Zionist settlement. Lacking the initiative to greatly aid 






 While some Zionist money did reach Arabs through land sales and employment, 
particularly in construction, the jobs paid very little and land transfers often led to the 
dispossession of the peasants. The belief that Zionist funds would greatly benefit the 
Arabs was quixotic. The Zionists invested only in their sector of the economy and sought 
to segregate themselves both socially and economically from the Arabs. By emphasizing 
hiring only Hebrew labor and buying only Hebrew goods, the Jews increasingly 
distanced themselves from the Arabs. Furthermore, the fellaheen often paid the price for 
the protective tariffs for Zionist industries. The cost of living went up for those who could 
least afford it. 
  Starting in 1930, there was a realization that the Arab economy could no longer 
be ignored. Prodded by the Shaw and Hope Simpson reports, the government planned to 
invest more in the Arab sector. Around the same time, there was also a change of officials 
in Jerusalem and London. The pro-Arab High Commissioner Sir John Chancellor 
replaced Lord Plumer while Lord Passfield replaced Leo Amery as Secretary of State for 
the Colonies. The Arabs were cautiously optimistic that the balance of power would 
begin to shift away from the Zionists. 
    In the end, they were greatly disappointed. The government did not crack down 
on land sales or Jewish immigration. Most of the recommendations of the Hope Simpson 
and Shaw reports that would have benefited the Arabs were ignored. Fiscal constraints 
continuously postponed and scaled back an ambitious development loan scheme 
proposed by Hope Simpson, and eventually, the entire project was shelved.
314
 The 
policies advocated by the Passfield Paper survived a mere four months before Zionist 
pressure had them annulled. The government failed to provide proper education and 
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training to Arab villages. The promises of the government were rarely fulfilled and when 
they were, it was not in a timely manner. For example, it took well over a decade to 
establish an agricultural bank. The Arabs had completely lost faith in the government. 
Even though the British continuously claimed to be neutral, it did not look like it to the 
Arabs. 
 In closing, this thesis makes two arguments. First, British policies from 1920-
1936 need to be viewed in a much wider context beyond the traditional dual 
commitments to the Zionists and the Arabs to include obligations towards the 
international community as well as to the British Empire. The economic decisions of the 
government of Palestine were not made in a vacuum and the High Commissioner needed 
to keep in mind larger imperial goals. Palestine was to support the empire through Haifa 
harbor and the oil pipeline from Iraq. The country also needed to pay for itself and not 
become a burden on the British tax payer. This last obligation meant that the government 
needed to build up a surplus in case of a rainy day instead of investing in agriculture. 
International obligations such as those dictated by the mandate, the British-American 
Covenant of 1924, and the Palestine-Syrian trade agreements meant that the government 
could not control trade policies. On the other hand, British trade agreements with most 
favored nations prevented the granting of Imperial Preference to Palestine. While the 
British were willing to skirt around international obligations to help British contractors 
and industries, they were not willing to do the same to protect Palestinian products. 
 The second argument is that British economic policies often had unintended 
consequences that either greatly angered the Arabs, hurt their sector of the economy, or 





key concessions to hydroelectricity and the Dead Sea minerals, the Arabs would see the 
economic benefit of the Zionists and come to terms with the Jewish National Home. This 
was not the case. The Zionists used these resources to support further immigration and 
settlement and the Arabs realized that the monopolization of these assets meant that the 
Jewish National Home was rapidly gaining power at their expense. Protected during the 
late 1920s by the government, Shemen Oil built an economy of scale. At lower prices, 
Shemen products sometimes undercut Arab soaps and oils and at the same time hurt Arab 
peasants. 
In agriculture, the government lacked the financial commitment needed to 
ameliorate the conditions of the fellaheen. Even when investments were made, very few 
improvements actually occurred. While the commuted tithe was meant to help the 
peasants, the drop in agricultural prices and crop failures combined with an increase in 
werko meant that they often paid more in taxes than before. The promise of agricultural 
credits languished for over a decade and when an agricultural bank finally was created, it 
mostly helped the Zionists. The British favored cooperatives because they were 
inexpensive, but the government waited until the 1930s to devote funds to the project, 
and even then, it failed to adequately carry through with it. The failure of the government 
to support the Arab economy in any meaningful way helped to create a politically 
charged atmosphere in the 1930s. Even when the government made a rational decision to 
postpone the income tax, the Arabs assumed it was the work of the Zionists. In the end, 
over 16 years of commitments to the international community, the Zionists, and the 
empire helped lead to the unintended consequences of British economic policies that 
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